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The Chance for Peace

Address by the President¹

White House press release dated April 16

In this spring of 1953 the free world weighs one question above all others: the chance for a just peace for all peoples.

To weigh this chance is to summon instantly to mind another recent moment of great decision. It came with that yet more hopeful spring of 1945, bright with the promise of victory and of freedom. The hope of all just men in that moment too was a just and lasting peace.

The 8 years that have passed have seen that hope waver, grow dim, and almost die. And the shadow of fear again has darkly lengthened across the world.

Today the hope of free men remains stubborn and brave, but it is sternly disciplined by experience. It shuns not only all crude counsel of despair but also the self-deceit of easy illusion. It weighs the chance for peace with sure, clear knowledge of what happened to the vain hope of 1945.

In that spring of victory the soldiers of the Western Allies met the soldiers of Russia in the center of Europe. They were triumphant comrades in arms. Their peoples shared the joyous prospect of building, in honor of their dead, the only fitting monument—an age of just peace. All these war-weary peoples shared too this concrete, decent purpose: to guard vigilantly against the domination ever again of any part of the world by a single, unbridled aggressive power.

This common purpose lasted an instant and

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perished. The nations of the world divided to follow two distinct roads.

The United States and our valued friends, the other free nations, chose one road.

The leaders of the Soviet Union chose another.

The Road Followed by the United States

The way chosen by the United States was plainly marked by a few clear precepts, which govern its conduct in world affairs.

First: No people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for all humanity shares the common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice.

Second: No nation's security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations.

Third: Any nation's right to a form of government and an economic system of its own choosing is *inalienable*.

Fourth: Any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is *indefensible*.

And fifth: A nation's hope of lasting peace cannot be firmly based upon any race in armaments but rather upon just relations and honest understanding with all other nations.

In the light of these principles the citizens of the United States defined the way they proposed to follow, through the aftermath of war, toward true peace.

This way was faithful to the spirit that inspired the United Nations: to prohibit strife, to relieve tensions, to banish fears. This way was to control and to reduce armaments. This way was to allow all nations to devote their energies and resources to the great and good tasks of heal-

ing the war's wounds, of clothing and feeding and housing the needy, of perfecting a just political life, of enjoying the fruits of their own free toil.

The Road Followed by the Soviet Union

The Soviet government held a vastly different vision of the future.

In the world of its design, security was to be found, not in mutual trust and mutual aid but in *force*: huge armies, subversion, rule of neighbor nations. The goal was power superiority at all cost. Security was to be sought by denying it to all others.

The result has been tragic for the world and, for the Soviet Union, it has also been ironic.

The amassing of Soviet power alerted free nations to a new danger of aggression. It compelled them in self-defense to spend unprecedented money and energy for armaments. It forced them to develop weapons of war now capable of inflicting instant and terrible punishment upon any aggressor.

It instilled in the free nations—and let none doubt this—the unshakable conviction that, as long as there persists a threat to freedom, they must, at any cost, remain armed, strong, and ready for any risk of war.

It inspired them—and let none doubt this—to attain a unity of purpose and will beyond the power of propaganda or pressure to break, now or ever.

There remained, however, one thing essentially unchanged and unaffected by Soviet conduct: the readiness of the free nations to welcome sincerely any genuine evidence of peaceful purpose enabling all peoples again to resume their common quest of just peace.

The free nations, most solemnly and repeatedly, have assured the Soviet Union that their firm association has never had any aggressive purpose whatsoever. Soviet leaders, however, have seemed to persuade themselves, or tried to persuade their people, otherwise.

And so it has come to pass that the Soviet Union itself has shared and suffered the very fears it has fostered in the rest of the world.

This has been the way of life forged by 8 years of fear and force.

What can the world, or any nation in it, hope for if no turning is found on this dread road?

A Life of Fear

The worst to be feared and the best to be expected can be simply stated.

The *worst* is atomic war.

The *best* would be this: a life of perpetual fear and tension; a burden of arms draining the wealth and the labor of all peoples; a wasting of strength that defies the American system or the Soviet system or any system to achieve true abundance and happiness for the peoples of this earth.

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.

The Costs of a World in Arms

This world in arms is not spending money alone.

It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.

It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population.

It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals.

It is some 50 miles of concrete highway.

We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat.

We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.

This, I repeat, is the best way of life to be found on the road the world has been taking.

This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

These plain and cruel truths define the peril and point the hope that come with this spring of 1953.

This is one of those times in the affairs of nations when the gravest choices must be made, if there is to be a turning toward a just and lasting peace.

It is a moment that calls upon the governments of the world to speak their intentions with simplicity and with honesty.

It calls upon them to answer the question that stirs the hearts of all sane men: *is there no other way the world may live?*

Beginning of a New Era

The world knows that an era ended with the death of Joseph Stalin. The extraordinary 30-year span of his rule saw the Soviet Empire

expand to reach from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan, finally to dominate 800 million souls.

The Soviet system shaped by Stalin and his predecessors was born of one World War. It survived with stubborn and often amazing courage a second World War. It has lived to threaten a third.

Now a new leadership has assumed power in the Soviet Union. Its links to the past, however strong, cannot bind it completely. Its future is, in great part, its own to make.

This new leadership confronts a free world aroused, as rarely in its history, by the will to stay free.

This free world knows, out of the bitter wisdom of experience, that vigilance and sacrifice are the price of liberty.

It knows that the defense of Western Europe imperatively demands the unity of purpose and action made possible by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, embracing a European Defense Community.

It knows that Western Germany deserves to be a free and equal partner in this community and that this, for Germany, is the only safe way to full, final unity.

It knows that aggression in Korea and in south-east Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action.

This is the kind of free world which the new Soviet leadership confronts. It is a world that demands and expects the fullest respect of its rights and interests. It is a world that will always accord the same respect to all others.

So the new Soviet leadership now has a precious opportunity to awaken, with the rest of the world, to the point of peril reached and to help turn the tide of history.

Will it do this?

We do not yet know. Recent statements and gestures of Soviet leaders give some evidence that they may recognize this critical moment.

We welcome every honest act of peace.

We care nothing for mere rhetoric.

We care only for sincerity of peaceful purpose attested by deeds. The opportunities for such deeds are many. The performance of a great number of them waits upon no complex protocol but upon the simple will to do them. Even a few such clear and specific acts, such as the Soviet Union's signature upon an Austrian treaty or its release of thousands of prisoners still held from World

War II, would be impressive signs of sincere intent. They would carry a power of persuasion not to be matched by any amount of oratory.

This we do know: a world that begins to witness the rebirth of trust among nations *can* find its way to a peace that is neither partial nor punitive.

With all who will work in good faith toward such a peace, we are ready, with renewed resolve, to strive to redeem the near-lost hopes of our day.

The first great step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea.

This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea.

It should mean, no less importantly, an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya. For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud.

We seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total.

Out of this can grow a still wider task—the achieving of just political settlements for the other serious and specific issues between the free world and the Soviet Union.

None of these issues, great or small, is insoluble—given only the will to respect the rights of all nations.

Again we say: the United States is ready to assume its just part.

We have already done all within our power to speed conclusion of a treaty with Austria, which will free that country from economic exploitation and from occupation by foreign troops.

We are ready not only to press forward with the present plans for closer unity of the nations of Western Europe but also, upon that foundation, to strive to foster a broader European community, conducive to the free movement of persons, of trade, and of ideas.

This community would include a free and united Germany, with a government based upon free and secret elections.

This free community and the full independence of the East European nations could mean the end of the present unnatural division of Europe.

Reduction of Armaments

As progress in all these areas strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of

armaments now weighing upon the world. To this end we would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements. These could properly include:

1. The limitation, by absolute numbers or by an agreed international ratio, of the sizes of the military and security forces of all nations.

2. A commitment by all nations to set an agreed limit upon that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes.

3. International control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons.

4. A limitation or prohibition of other categories of weapons of great destructiveness.

5. The enforcement of all these agreed limitations and prohibitions by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations.

The details of such disarmament programs are manifestly critical and complex. Neither the United States nor any other nation can properly claim to possess a perfect, immutable formula. But the formula matters less than the faith—the good faith without which no formula can work justly and effectively.

A New Kind of War

The fruit of success in all these tasks would present the world with the greatest task, and the greatest opportunity, of all. It is this: the dedication of the energies, the resources, and the imaginations of all peaceful nations to a new kind of war. This would be a declared total war, not upon any human enemy but upon the brute forces of poverty and need.

The peace we seek, founded upon decent trust and cooperative effort among nations, can be fortified, not by weapons of war but by wheat and by cotton, by milk and by wool, by meat and by timber and by rice. These are words that translate into every language on earth. These are needs that challenge this world in arms.

This idea of a just and peaceful world is not new or strange to us. It inspired the people of the United States to initiate the European Recovery Program in 1947. That program was prepared to treat, with like and equal concern, the needs of Eastern and Western Europe.

We are prepared to reaffirm, with the most concrete evidence, our readiness to help build a world in which all peoples can be productive and prosperous.

This Government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction. The purposes of this great work would be to help other peoples to develop the undeveloped areas of the world, to stimulate profitable and fair world trade, to assist all peoples to know the blessings of productive freedom.

The monuments to this new kind of war would be these: roads and schools, hospitals and homes, food and health.

We are ready, in short, to dedicate our strength to serving the *needs*, rather than the *fears*, of the world.

We are ready, by these and all such actions, to make of the United Nations an institution that can effectively guard the peace and security of all peoples.

I know of nothing I can add to make plainer the sincere purpose of the United States.

I know of no course, other than that marked by these and similar actions, that can be called the highway of peace.

I know of only one question upon which progress waits. It is this:

What Is the Soviet Union Ready To Do?

Whatever the answer be, let it be plainly spoken.

Again we say: the hunger for peace is too great, the hour in history too late, for any government to mock men's hopes with mere words and promises and gestures.

The test of truth is simple. There can be no persuasion but by deeds.

Is the new leadership of the Soviet Union prepared to use its decisive influence in the Communist world, including control of the flow of arms, to bring not merely an expedient truce in Korea but genuine peace in Asia?

Is it prepared to allow other nations, including those of Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own forms of government?

Is it prepared to act in concert with others upon serious disarmament proposals to be made firmly effective by stringent U. N. control and inspection?

If not, where then is the concrete evidence of the Soviet Union's concern for peace?

The test is clear.

There is, before all peoples, a precious chance to turn the black tide of events. If we failed to strive to seize this chance, the judgment of future ages would be harsh and just.

If we strive but fail and the world remains armed against itself, it at least need be divided no longer in its clear knowledge of who has condemned humankind to this fate.

The purpose of the United States, in stating these proposals, is simple and clear.

These proposals spring, without ulterior pur-

pose or political passion, from our calm conviction that the hunger for just peace is in the hearts of all peoples—those of Russia and of China no less than of our own country.

They conform to our firm faith that God created men to enjoy, not destroy, the fruits of the earth and of their own toil.

They aspire to this: the lifting, from the backs and from the hearts of men, of their burden of arms and of fears, so that they may find before them a golden age of freedom and of peace.

The First 90 Days

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

Press release 200 dated April 18

President Eisenhower, speaking here last Thursday,² opened the door to the mansion of peace. He invited the Soviet Union to come in. That invitation was not mere rhetoric. Its timing was not chosen at hazard. It marked a planned stage in the evolution of Eisenhower foreign policy. The speech really had its beginning when President Eisenhower took office, which was 90 days ago tomorrow.

The words which President Eisenhower uttered might have been uttered at any time during these past 90 days. But these words gained immensely in significance because they came against a background of cohesive, positive action.

When President Eisenhower first took office, a plea for peace such as he made this week might have been interpreted as a sign of weakness or a mere gesture of sentimentality. In order that such a plea should carry maximum impact, it was first

necessary to demonstrate to the world, and to Soviet leaders in particular, President Eisenhower's will and capacity to develop foreign policies so firm, so fair, so just that the Soviet leaders might find it expedient to live with these policies rather than to live against them.

I should like briefly to review this 90-day period, which had as its climax the President's historical address.

The European Defense Community

One of the worries of the free world, and one of the hopes of the Soviet world, has been disunity in Western Europe. For example, it would be particularly disastrous for the West if Franco-German antagonism were revived. That would indeed afford Soviet intrigue a fertile field of operation.

The continental European countries themselves, including France and Germany, had seen the danger and had devised a program to meet it. They had proposed to create a European Defense Community, the members of which would merge their military power into a single force. A treaty

¹ Made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and broadcast to the Nation over radio and television networks on Apr. 18. Also printed as Department of State publication 5044.

² *Supra*.

to this effect was signed nearly a year ago. It was contemplated by the treaty that it would be ratified and come into force within 6 months. But, following the signature of the treaty, nothing happened. Last January it seemed that the project was dying.

The President, out of his own intimate knowledge of European conditions, felt that our Government should indicate its deep concern and point out that failure to realize the European Defense Community could mean collapse of the hopes and efforts that inspired the Marshall plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the mutual security program. Therefore, on January 30, just 10 days after the President's inaugural, Mr. Stassen and I, at the President's request, visited the six European Defense Community countries and also Great Britain. As a result of our visit and the return visits to Washington of several European leaders, this project has now been revived. It cannot yet be confidently predicted that it will be realized. But it is today the liveliest single topic before the six parliaments of continental Europe.

The Soviet Union now faces the likelihood that Western Europe will produce a unified military force, including French and Germans. Thus would come to a final end one of the hopes from which Soviet imperialism has taken comfort.

NATO

It was never expected that the European Defense Community, when created, would alone carry the burdens of making Western Europe secure. EDC, a community of 6, would stand within the framework of NATO, a partnership of 14. This partnership, however, also presented us with urgent problems. For most of the members had come to feel that the program for NATO represented a type of effort which they could not continue indefinitely to bear.

The United States and its NATO partners had been operating on the assumption that the moment of greatest danger was some early, predictable date. Therefore, it had been reasoned, emergency efforts should be made to meet that date, leaving subsequent years for stabilization and recuperation.

But the Soviet Union did not conveniently relax its threat in order to meet the preconceived timetable of the NATO countries. Accordingly it was found necessary each year to prolong the extraor-

dinary exertion and to defer the period of stabilization. This spasmodic approach was exhaustive to all concerned. Several of our allies told us that they could not hold to the present pace without greatly increased help from the United States.

The situation obviously called for a fresh approach.

Because we did not believe that any specific date of peak danger could be reliably forecast; because Soviet communism itself professes to operate in terms of "an entire historical era"; because new weapons inevitably change the aspect of the military task; because a vigorous and happy society is itself an important ingredient of freedom—for these reasons we decided to find programs which, on the one hand, will provide Europe with substantial insurance against being overrun by Soviet attack and which, on the other hand, can, if necessary, be sustained for an indefinite period with growing reliance on Western Europe's own strength.

Next week the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Humphrey, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wilson, the Director for Mutual Security, Mr. Stassen, and I will go to Paris to meet with the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council. There we shall listen sympathetically to the point of view of our partners and together with them concert military programs designed to deter attack from without, without undermining inner strength.

All will know, and I am confident that the Soviet leaders know best of all, that what we plan is not greater weakness but greater strength. The productivity of the free world is so prodigious, its inventiveness so phenomenal, that any military aggressor that attacked our free-world partnership would be doomed to sure defeat.

What we plan is to dissipate another Soviet hope, the hope expressed by Stalin when he said that "the moment for the decisive blow" would come when the opponents of communism "have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength . . . have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy so that our victory is assured." We do not intend that that moment of bankruptcy shall come.

Let me add that the policy here expressed was determined upon without regard to any of the recent Soviet moves. We are not dancing to any Russian tune. Nothing that has happened has in-

duced in us a mood of relaxation or any desire to weaken NATO. The purpose and the result will be a NATO more sure to live and to perform its appointed tasks.

The Far East

In the Far East vigorous policy decisions were also taken since the 90 days began. In Korea we embarked upon a program to change the complexion of that struggle. As President Eisenhower told you, we still welcome an armistice, not merely to end the fighting but on the assumption that it will lead to a peace which accords with the principles of the United Nations—and that means a free and united Korea. Of course we want peace in Korea. But we do not play the role of suppliants.

We have vastly improved our relations with the National Government of China. We now have an Ambassador at Taipei, Formosa, the provisional capital. We are speeding the delivery of military assistance, which was woefully in arrears. President Eisenhower has changed the instructions to the Seventh Fleet so that, while it is still instructed to protect Formosa, it is no longer instructed to protect the Chinese Communists on the mainland.

In relation to Indochina, the French Government and the Associated States have been told that we would be favorably disposed to giving increased military and financial assistance to plans realistically designed to suppress the Communist-inspired civil war, which for 6 years has wracked the area and seriously drained the metropolitan resources of France.

We recently announced, in conjunction with the French Government,³ that should the Chinese Communist regime take advantage of a Korean armistice to pursue aggressive war elsewhere in the Far East, such action would have the most serious consequences and would conflict directly with the understanding on which any armistice in Korea was reached. That decision was taken prior to the recent revival of prospects for a Korean armistice. It was part of our effort to anticipate what may happen rather than to catch up with what has happened.

We negotiated with the Governments of Britain, France, and other maritime powers for a tightening of the blockade of Communist China. They are taking important practical measures to restrict

the voyages of their own ships to China and to withhold fuel from ships of other nations which are carrying strategic goods to China.

You can see, as others have seen, that a new order of priority and urgency has been given to the Far East. Further, it has been made clear that we consider that our Eastern friends, from Japan, Korea, and Formosa to Indochina and Malaya, face a single hostile front, to be met with a common purpose and growing cooperation as between the component parts of freedom.

This means that the Communists in the Far East can no longer count on winning by shifting their strength and by focusing attack on one or another free-world position that is isolated from the others. The Communist strategy, based on a contiguous land mass, is now confronted by a growing free-world unity based upon the peninsular positions and offshore island chain now controlled by the free peoples of Asia.

The Middle East and Latin America

The Middle East and Latin America, two areas far apart, have both been the subject of Communist attempts at infiltration. The ground was fertile because these areas have somewhat lacked our attention; and, in the case of the Middle East, there has developed a spirit of nationalism, which has at times grown fanatical in its opposition to the Western Powers.

As was announced some weeks ago, Mr. Stassen and I have been invited by the governments of more than a dozen countries of the Middle East and South Asia to visit them. We have accepted and plan to go next month. That is significant, for no United States Secretary of State has ever visited any of these countries. It will afford us an opportunity to meet at firsthand many of the leaders and, I hope, to dissipate the false impressions which Communist propaganda has fomented.

As President Eisenhower announced last Sunday,⁴ the State Department is organizing a goodwill mission to South America, which will be headed by the President's brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower. He will personally carry the President's sentiments of good will toward the Republics and peoples to the south of us. Our new Assistant Secretary for this area is already in Central America.

I have had the pleasure of two meetings, one at

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1953, p. 491.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 563.

the United Nations and the other at Washington, with the representatives of all 20 of the American Republics.

What we have done, and what we already plan, mark a determination to develop better understanding and more fellowship with peoples whom we know and respect but whose friendship we have taken too much for granted. Thereby we may close another possible avenue of Soviet Communist aggression.

Captive Peoples

The free peoples are susceptible to Soviet guile because they so passionately want peace that they can readily be attracted by illusions of peace. One such illusion is a settlement based on the *status quo*. This present status involves the captivity of hundreds of millions of persons of distinctive nationality, race, religion, and culture. The hardest task of the Soviet rulers is to beat this disunity into Communist conformity. If that can be done, then the menace of Soviet communism will be immeasurably increased.

It was of the utmost importance that we should make clear to the captive peoples that we do not accept their captivity as a permanent fact of history. If they thought otherwise and became hopeless, we would unwittingly have become partners to the forging of a hostile power so vast that it could encompass our destruction.

President Eisenhower, anticipating some of the events that have since occurred, acted immediately after his inauguration to propose that our national position should be made clear through a solemn resolution concurred in by Congress and the President. The Congress has yet to act. However, I am persuaded, and I trust that the captive peoples are persuaded, that Congress in fact fully shares the point of view that President Eisenhower expressed. In any event the Chief Executive has formulated his position on this important matter and by doing so has foreclosed another of the hopes which Soviet rulers had optimistically entertained.

State Department Organization

While we have been making these policy decisions, we have at the same time been acting to assure that the State Department would be able to make new policies wherever these would seem better than the old and to assure a steadily rising level of performance.

In addition to the new Secretary of State, there are two new Under Secretaries, one of whom specializes in administration and security matters. There are six new Assistant Secretaries. There is a new Legal Adviser, a new Counselor, a new Director of International Information Administration, who has responsibility for the Voice of America. The whole Policy Planning Staff is to go under new direction and be coordinated closely with the revitalized National Security Council.

We are also bringing fresh vision and new vigor into our United Nations Mission and into our Embassies abroad. The Chief of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations, former Senator Austin, retired last January after many years of distinguished service. He has been succeeded by former Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who now heads the Permanent Mission. His vigor and parliamentary skill already demonstrate that the Soviet leaders cannot look forward to using the United Nations as a sounding board for propaganda but that they will have to deal in the United Nations with a mobilized body of world opinion which is determined that the United Nations shall, in fact, serve its avowed purpose to maintain international peace and security in conformity with the principles of justice.

New Ambassadors are installed or being installed in Great Britain, Ireland, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, Spain, Mexico, Brazil, Japan, Free China, India, and Pakistan. Other appointments are in contemplation.

For the first time in State Department history, all of our major appointments are subject to FBI field checks so as to eliminate security risks and possibility of hostile infiltration into high places. So far as is humanly practical, we are seeing to it that Communist agents shall not have access to the State Department.

We are fortunate in having a body of Foreign Service career men and women who can be the main reliance of the President and myself. They are a permanent and nonpolitical part of Government. They became such under the Rogers Act, enacted by a Republican Congress during the administration of President Coolidge and Secretary Hughes.

There is a tendency in some quarters to feel that confidence cannot be placed in these career officials because in the past, as was their duty, they served under Democrat Presidents and Democrat Secretaries of State. It is, however, easier than most think for our career Foreign Service men and

women to adapt themselves to new Republican leadership. Like career soldiers, Foreign Service officers respect and welcome high-level policy direction such as they are getting under President Eisenhower. They are, with rare exceptions, a splendid and patriotic group of men and women, with a fine tradition. They are experts, trained to analyze and interpret foreign conditions and to carry out designated missions, usually of delicacy, sometimes of danger. Just as the Nation depends for defense purposes on the graduates of our Military and Naval academies, so the Nation for foreign services depends on our career diplomats.

Our people here at home, our friends abroad, and our enemies abroad can know that we have not only strong foreign policies but that we are rapidly molding an organization which will be secure and which will be efficient in action.

I might add, as of particular interest to this distinguished group of American editors, that these foreign policies of which I speak are no longer looked upon as state secrets. We are determined that the public shall be as fully informed as possible, and in the clearest and simplest language possible, about what we are doing in the State Department and what our foreign policy is.

I have long felt that, under our form of government, the effectiveness of foreign policy depends in large measure upon public understanding and support of it.

The Soviet Peace Defensive

Our conduct has been calmly strong, never truculent nor blustering. In the face of it Soviet leaders gave evidence that they were changing their policies. They initiated what presents to you and to me one of the most perplexing problems of our time. It is a problem that I think is largely due to a misnomer. The Kremlin launched what is commonly called a "peace offensive." Whatever it is that the Kremlin has launched—and no one can be sure just yet what it is—it is not a peace offensive. It is a peace defensive.

It is gratifying that Soviet leaders appear now to have shifted from an offensive to a defensive mood. But we cannot yet tell whether this represents a basic change or merely a tactical shift. It is prudent, for the present, to assume that we are witnessing a tactical move of the kind which Soviet communism has often practiced.

Stalin, in his classic treatise on "Strategy and

Tactics," taught that, from time to time, "concessions" may have to be made "in order to buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite." He went on to explain the necessity of maneuvering with a "view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong. . . . The object of this strategy is to gain time and to accumulate forces in order later to assume the offensive."

Is the successor—or should I say, are the successors—following this strategy of the dead Stalin?

Whatever the reason and purpose of present Soviet moves, the fact is that the Communist leaders seem now disposed to grant some things which they formerly denied.

Last February 22, in an effort to probe the mood of the enemy in Korea, we quietly proposed an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.⁵ Such proposals had frequently been made before, without results. This time a result seems to be in the making.

I should perhaps explain, to end some misunderstanding, that while under the agreement made we will return many more sick and wounded prisoners than we will receive, that is because the total number of prisoners which we hold is many times the number held by the Communists. The ratio of returning sick and wounded to the total prisoners of war held is approximately the same for both sides, with a slight advantage in our favor.

It also now appears that the enemy may now want an armistice in Korea, after having evaded it for nearly 2 years.

In other respects and in other quarters Communist leadership is making concessions. These are all still minor but not without significance. They suggested to us that the time had come to launch a true peace offensive. That President Eisenhower has done. Soviet leadership is now confronted by the Eisenhower tests. Will it meet, one by one, the issues with which President Eisenhower has challenged it? If so, will it abolish and abandon, in fact as well as in name, the Cominform through which it endlessly conspires to overthrow, from within, every genuinely free government in the world? We await the deeds which will give answer to these questions. We profoundly hope that these deeds will, in fact, end a black chapter of distrust and open a bright new chapter of peace and good will.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 494.

The New Era

Some weeks ago when I was at the United Nations, I said that the Stalin era had ended and that the Eisenhower era had begun, bringing with it new hope for all mankind.⁶ Already that prediction is in process of confirmation. President Eisenhower's address is a fact which will inevitably influence the course of history. Around the world peoples and governments have universally welcomed that address. In all the capitals of the free world, press and radio have demonstrated an unprecedented spontaneous support for the Presi-

⁶ *Ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1953, p. 430.

Full Truce Talks To Reopen at Panmunjom

LETTER FROM GENERAL HARRISON TO GENERAL NAM II, APRIL 17¹

To General Nam II, Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers.

1. The Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command has authorized me to instruct the United Nations Command Liaison Group to meet with the Liaison Group of your side on April 18 or as soon thereafter as is agreeable to your side, to discuss matters incidental to reopening plenary sessions of the Armistice Delegations as requested by your Liaison Group on 11 April, 1953.

2. The United Nations Command has studied the statement of the official position of your side which you presented,² but does not find the amplification of details regarding the statements of Foreign Minister Chou En-lai and Marshall Kim Il Sung, which was requested in General Clark's letter of 5 April, 1953. However, in view of the agreement by your commanders in their letter of 1 April to the proposal advanced in General Clark's letter of 31 March, it is assumed that you are prepared to accept UNC proposals or make a comparable constructive proposal of your own

¹ On Apr. 18 the Communists replied to General Harrison's letter, and liaison officers met on Apr. 19. They agreed to reopen plenary sessions on Apr. 25.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1953, p. 575.

dent's call for a world-wide peace offensive and his challenge to the new Soviet leadership to back up their words with deeds. That response is not merely because of the words the President used but because what he said had its setting in a 90-day framework.

I do not attempt to read the future. That must always remain obscure so long as vast power is possessed by men who accept no guidance from the moral law. But surely our duty is clear. Those who represent a Nation with the tradition and power of the United States must act boldly and strongly for what they believe to be right. The future is for a higher verdict.

which would constitute a valid basis for resumption of the meetings.

3. With reference to the statements of Foreign Minister Chou En-lai and Marshall Kim Il Sung, the UNC would consider that an arrangement such as the following would be reasonable and constructive and could lead to a prompt resolution of the problem of prisoners of war:

(1) That the neutral state be a nation such as Switzerland, traditionally recognized as appropriate in matters of this kind;

(2) That in the interest of practicality, prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated be released to the custody in Korea of the neutral state;

(3) That after allowing a reasonable time such as 60 days during which opportunity has been afforded by the neutral state to the parties concerned to determine the attitudes of individuals in its custody with respect to their status, the neutral state will make arrangements for the peaceable disposition of those remaining in its custody.

4. The United Nations Command is of the opinion that unless the meetings of the full delegations indicate that an acceptable agreement will be reached in a reasonable time, it will be advisable to recess the meetings again.

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR., Lt. Gen. USA
Senior Delegate, UNC Delegation.

SUMMARY OF LIAISON MEETING OF APRIL 11

1. Meeting of Senior Liaison Group convened at 1100 hours this date. Substance of record follows:

2. UNC: "I have a statement to make. Yesterday you said you had around 15 prisoners of war of other nationalities, including those of Turkey, Canada, Greece, the Netherlands, etc. You also said you were checking the figure to determine the breakdown by nationality. Do you have this breakdown today?"

3. Communists: "As I pointed out yesterday to your side, I will give you the figures as soon as our checking is finished. I propose that prior to signing the agreement the interpreters of both sides check the drafts we are to sign."

4. UNC: a. "I have been studying the figures you have furnished which indicate the approximate number of sick and injured captured personnel you intend to repatriate. I believe that you will agree that medicine is not an exact science; accordingly, for humanitarian reasons, I again request that you use the broadest interpretation of the degree of sickness in determining the final number of captured personnel who will be repatriated. We will do the same."

b. "We have prepared our copies of the agreement for repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel for signature. If your side has prepared your copies of the agreement, I agree that the interpreters check the various versions and that we recess for this purpose for 10 minutes."

5. Communists: a. "As I have pointed out before, the estimated figures of sick and injured prisoners of war furnished by our side are the result of serious checking in accordance with the principle which our side has consistently maintained, that is, the principle of repatriating all sick and injured prisoners of war. Our side considers that there should be no further dispute about this question."



b. "In order to check the versions of the agreement, Captain Munchae Su, NKA, and Tuan Lien Chung, CCF, will participate in this work."

6. UNC: "I appoint Lt. Underwood, Captain Lum, and Lt. Wu for our side."

7. Communists: "I agree to your proposal to recess for 10 minutes."

(Meeting recessed at 1110 hours. Meeting reconvened at 1205 hours.)

8. Communists: "Prior to signing of both sides, I want to make a statement as follows:

a. "Both sides have reached agreement on the exchange of sick and injured prisoners of war during the period of hostilities in accordance with the principles of Article 10 of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. Our side has consistently stood for and will immediately carry out the repatriation in toto of sick and injured prisoners of war held in our custody. Your side has stated that you will invoke the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention and repatriate only a part of the sick and injured prisoners of war held in your custody."

b. "In this connection our side has pointed out that the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention can by no means be used as a pretext for employing coercive means to obstruct the repatriation of sick and injured prisoners of war who are willing to return to our side during the period of hostilities."

c. "Now our side must state again that our side reserves the right to request that the sick and injured captured personnel of our side not repatriated this time be handed over to a neutral state so as to secure a just solution to the question of their repatriation after an armistice."

d. "Furthermore, our side proposes that the liaison group meetings shall be continued after the signing. We have other matters to bring up at the meeting."

e. "Then, I propose to begin to sign."

9. UNC: "I agree." (Actual signing begins at 1208 and is completed at 1210 and one half hours.)

10. UNC: "I have a statement to make."

a. "We are ready to start the actual repatriation at Panmunjom of the sick and wounded captured personnel held in our custody on 72 hours notice. Can you tell me when you will be able to start repatriating our captured personnel?"

b. "I agree to the continuation of the liaison group officers' meeting. I recommend that we recess now. I will be ready to meet with you again at any time you desire."

11. Communists: a. "As to the question raised by your side, I will answer tomorrow."

b. "Now I would like to raise a question concerning the resumption of the plenary session of the delegations of both sides. In the letter of March 28 addressed to your commander³ our commanders have already pointed out that the reasonable settlement of the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war of both sides during the period of hostilities should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war. Such a view has already been agreed to by your commander. Now, inasmuch as both sides have signed the agreement for the repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel and our side has in addition put forth a new proposal for settling the entire question of repatriation of prisoners of war, and has given a full explanation of this proposal, our side considers that the plenary session of the delegations of both sides should be resumed immediately to discuss and settle the entire question of prisoners of war so as to realize an armistice in Korea. I would like to know the views of your side on the date of resuming the plenary session."

12. UNC: "I have noted your statement and will inform my superiors."

³ For text of the agreement, see *ibid.*, p. 576.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 494.

a. "I propose that we recess now and I will notify you through liaison officers when we are ready to meet again to give you our answer.

b. "I suggest that the staff officers meet at 1345 to continue their work."

13. *Communists:* a. "Our side holds that both sides should immediately discuss and decide on the date for resuming the plenary sessions of the delegations. Since your side has proposed a recess to consider it we would not insist, but our side still hopes that the liaison groups' meeting should be resumed within one (1) or two (2) days to discuss and decide on the date for resuming the plenary sessions.

b. "I agree to your proposal that the staff officers' meeting be resumed."

14. UNC: "We have noted your statement. We agree to recess."

15. Meeting adjourned at 1222 hours.

Technical Assistance to Iraq For Land Development Program

Press release 187 dated April 10

Under an agreement signed at Baghdad on April 7, the U.S. Technical Cooperation Mission in Iraq will provide technical assistance to the Government of Iraq in carrying out its vast "Miri Sif" land development and resettlement program.

The Miri Sif (state-owned lands) of Iraq involve about 19 million acres, about two-thirds of which are considered to be capable of agricultural use with some degree of development. There are more than 2 million landless farmers in Iraq, tenants and peasants of large landholders, presently averaging \$200 or less per family per year in income.

About 3 years ago, the Government of Iraq enacted legislation providing for the division of state-owned lands into family-size farms, providing for irrigation water and other types of assistance needed to develop the lands for agriculture, and for opening them up for settlement by peasant families.

At present there are three projects in operation, involving some 200,000 acres and 1,600 families. Other projects in various stages of development involve well over a million acres and are planned to accommodate about 10,000 families. The annual income of farmers already settled averages two to three times their former incomes, mainly as a result of being able to retain the proceeds of their labor.

The Miri Sif program holds great significance, as one of the most important and largest-scale efforts by a Near Eastern government to encourage and assist peasants to become owner-operators of family-sized farms. A considerable amount of Iraq's oil revenues are being devoted to the development of the lands, providing community facilities, building roads, giving financial assistance and guidance to the farmers, providing health services, schools, water supplies, and the like. The program is considered by the Govern-

ment of Iraq to be of great significance in its social and economic development and in improving the living conditions of its people.

A major difficulty in carrying out this vast program has been the general scarcity of technicians in Iraq. The project involves enormous problems—lands must be surveyed and classified according to their agricultural capabilities; soil surveys must be made; irrigation works must be planned and constructed; peasant farmers must be given assistance in farm planning and management through the first critical years of independent operation; credit facilities must be offered with some supervision of loans; schools must be set up and provided with teachers; health clinics must be established and manned; guidance must be given in the formation and operation of cooperatives; instruction in improved methods of farming is needed by most of the settlers; malaria control is necessary in many sections; and so on. The small staff of specialists in the Ministry of Agriculture, which administers the program, and the Ministries of Education and Health which are assisting with it, are spread thinly over the huge program, which will reach into almost every part of Iraq.

Under the new agreement, the Technical Cooperation Administration (which administers the technical cooperation program) will assist in planning the program, will help provide technical advice, will help train Iraqi technicians, will assist with some of the research and survey work, and will provide some demonstrational equipment and supplies as needed to teach improved methods.

The agreement does not provide for any additional allocation of funds or additional American personnel, although future project agreements may provide for supplies, equipment, and possibly additional personnel.

The technical cooperation program in Iraq is carried out under a general agreement for technical cooperation between the Government of Iraq and the United States, which was signed on April 10, 1951.¹ Cooperative activities are now under way in the fields of agriculture, water resources, education, industrial development, highway transportation, health and sanitation, and social affairs.

MSA Grant to Yugoslavia

The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) on April 6 announced a special grant of \$11 million to Yugoslavia for the current fiscal year.

This sum, like a similar grant of \$20 million announced in January,² has been made to offset the results of last year's disastrous drought by pro-

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1951, p. 653.

² BULLETIN of Jan. 26, 1953, p. 135.

viding funds for the purchase of foodstuffs—principally, corn, wheat, lard, and sugar.

The new grant brings to \$109,000,000 the total of U.S. aid in defense-support funds to Yugoslavia during the current fiscal year. In addition to the \$31 million for drought relief, Yugoslavia is receiving \$78 million from Msa as part of a \$99 million tripartite-aid program to which the United Kingdom and France are also contributing. The tripartite program is designed to assist Yugoslavia in maintaining its defense effort.

Libby Dam and Reservoir

Press release 190 dated April 11

The following letter was sent by Secretary Dulles to the International Joint Commission—United States and Canada, regarding the application by the Government of the United States for the construction and operation of Libby Dam and Reservoir, filed with the Commission on January 12, 1951:

APRIL 8, 1953

*The International Joint Commission,
Washington, D. C., United States of America; and
Ottawa, Ontario, Dominion of Canada.*

SIRS:

Reference is made to the Application dated January 12, 1951 filed by the Government of the United States with the International Joint Commission for approval of the construction and operation of a dam and reservoir referred to as "Libby Dam" on the Kootenai River near Libby, Montana.

Consideration has been given by the Chief of Engineers of the Department of the Army to the advisability of the withdrawal of the Application in order that examination might be made with respect to certain domestic questions as selection of the axis for the dam, relocations and related matters that could be dealt with in accordance with regularly established procedures, rather than intermingled with investigation of the international aspects of the case.

In view of these developments you are advised that the Government of the United States, in accordance with a request of the Secretary of the Army, hereby withdraws the Application for the approval of the Libby Dam project effective as of this date.

Very truly yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State

Upon receipt of the letter the Commission has taken action in accordance therewith.

Specified Exemption Laws for Escapee Program

EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 532 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as added by section 7 (m) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952 (Public Law 400, approved June 20, 1952, 66 Stat. 146), it is hereby determined that the performance of functions with respect to the escapee program, authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and administered by the Department of State, without regard to the three following-designated provisions of law will further the purposes of the said Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended:

1. Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, 60 Stat. 809 (31 U. S. C. 529).

2. Section 305 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, approved June 30, 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 396 (41 U. S. C. 255).

3. Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U. S. C. 5).

This order supersedes Executive Order No. 10410 of November 14, 1952,² entitled "Specification of Laws from which the Escapee Program Administered by the Department of State Shall be Exempt."

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 17, 1953.

U. S. Interest in Stability of Japan's Economy

The following statement was made on April 15 by Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations:

The future stability of the Japanese economy is, of course, of great concern to the United States, which is giving a great deal of thought to this question. In recent years Japan's balance-of-payments position has been largely supported by U.S. expenditures arising from hostilities in Korea, the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan, and various U.S. mutual-assistance programs for the Far East. The Department believes that total U.S. expenditures in Japan will not be sharply reduced but will remain at a relatively high level for at least the next 2 years. However, if a serious situation were ever to develop in the Japanese economy, the Department is sure that the U.S. officials would want to sit down together with Japanese representatives to consider ways in which this Government could help.

¹ 10446, 18 Fed. Reg. 2209.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 8, 1952, p. 909.

The Soviet Germ Warfare Campaign: A Case History

Statements by Ernest A. Gross

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 27

I should like to explain why the United States requested the General Assembly to consider as part of its agenda the item which has now been reached: "The Question of an Impartial Investigation of the Charge of Use by the United Nations Forces of Bacteriological Warfare." My Government is asking the General Assembly to create and to supervise an impartial investigation of these charges which the Soviet representative in the Security Council has called "a serious international accusation against the United States Government." In fact, the target of these charges is no less a body than the United Nations itself. If this Organization is worthy of our support and of our confidence, then it must see these charges for what they are and see that they are weighed and set at rest. What could be a more fundamental revolt against the purpose of the Charter to develop friendly relations among nations than the repeated charge of germ warfare?

In attacking the United Nations itself, they seek to undermine the collective effort of the U.N. forces in meeting aggression in Korea. We cannot ignore an attack of this nature upon the character of the men who are giving their lives for the free world in this collective effort.

While the Chinese and North Korean people fight and die in their aggressive war in Korea, the Soviet Union furnishes supplies and lies.

This false and malicious campaign, this "serious international accusation," is designed and intended to spread hatred, division, and suspicion in the minds of men. It is designed to increase the tensions in the world. This being the inevitable result of the Soviet campaign of lies and hatred, the question arises whether it is the considered purpose of the Soviet Government thus to under-

mine and destroy the very foundation of international good will and cooperation. If this indeed is the considered purpose of the new Soviet leadership, how are we to appraise their professions of peace? How can we achieve a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues when one side continues to spread charges that are false, known to be false, and which it has never been willing to put to the proof?

This campaign of international communism must not be ignored. Its venom is intended to make each man fear his neighbor just as international communism would have each nation of the free world suspect its neighbor and so foster the tension upon which Soviet imperialism thrives.

Quite clearly, one specific objective is to isolate the free world from the United States by attempting to single out my Government for special condemnation. That is why the people of the free world should for the sake of their own security look long and hard at the facts.

How the Charges Have Survived

But how, one may ask, can these vicious charges live—how can they be repeated when in the United Nations, and in the free world at least, the truth is there for any man to see and to hear if he will seek it out? We must first of all look at just how these charges have been able to survive.

Since March of 1952 until today, an impartial investigation of the charge of bacteriological warfare has been offered over and over again by the United Nations, by the World Health Organization, and by the International Committee of Red Cross Societies. It has been offered also by my own Government within and without the United Nations just as it is put forward by my own Government here today.

There has been no response from the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist regime, and the North Korean authorities except on one occasion.

¹ Made on Mar. 27 and Apr. 8 in Committee I (Political and Security).

It is not part of their plan to respond. It is their plan to lie and then hide from an impartial investigation. Their tactic of "lie and hide" is cowardly—but it is a calculated cowardice.

The one response from the Soviet Union to the decision of the Security Council to investigate what the Soviet representative himself called "a serious international accusation" was a Soviet veto. That is not a response which is open to the Soviet representative in this forum.

We must see this campaign for what it is. It is the technique of the big lie. Let me briefly trace its history. No one describes it better than Hitler when, writing in *Mein Kampf*, he said:

In the size of the lie, there is always contained a certain factor of credibility . . . [The masses] will more easily fall victims to a great lie than to a small one, since they themselves perhaps also lie sometimes in little things but would be too much ashamed of too great lies. Thus, such an untruth will not enter their heads and therefore they will be unable to believe in the possibility of the enormous impudence, of the most infamous distortions, in others.

But it was Stalin himself who invented the bacteriological warfare lie. Back on January 7, 1933, in a statement to the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he attacked certain resistance elements of the Soviet population which, he said:

Organize wrecking activities in the collective and state farms, and some of them, including certain professors, go to such lengths in their zeal for wrecking as to inject the germs of plague and anthrax into cattle on the collective farms, help spread meningitis among horses, etc.

In the Purge Trials of 1937 and 1938, with which Mr. Vyshinsky is not unfamiliar, again we find the bacteriological warfare lie. One defendant "confessed" to manufacturing virulent bacteria in three separate factories in order to destroy herds of Soviet swine. Another defendant "confessed" that he had connived with Japanese intelligence to infect the Red army with "highly virulent bacilli" in the event of war.

Global Organization of the Campaign

I come now to the second stage of the case history of the lie. The campaign charging germ warfare in Korea was launched on February 21, 1952. It has been with us ever since. It is a long-term affair and fully organized on a global basis. From Moscow the campaign is directed. From Peiping and other Communist capitals it is coordinated. By all the Communist and fellow-traveler communication media and apparatus it is disseminated. The division of labor is clear-cut. Raw material flows from Moscow and Peiping. By that, I mean the so-called documentation, announcements of raids, protests, etc. The "eyewitness evidence" is provided by the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. It is they who

issue the initial protests. The Soviet Government, in addition to exercising primary responsibility for coordination of the worldwide big lie efforts, bolsters the so-called "evidence" with its own peculiar interpretations of evidence and statements, arranges for satellite and international front organization protests, and conducts the big lie campaign in the United Nations.

The Communist-front World Peace Council leads most of the protest movements and is the focal point for various groups who call themselves investigatory commissions and make reports on the charges.

You will undoubtedly soon hear from the lips of the Soviet representative the latest product of this campaign. It has been continued regularly in the columns of the Soviet Government press. For example, as recently as March 16 a headline appeared in *Pravda*: "American Aggressors Continue Bacteriological Warfare in Korea." The story goes on to charge that American planes have recently dropped 16 types of insects in various villages in Korea.

Let me now turn to certain devices used by the Communists in building up and spreading the lie. The Communists have repeatedly employed Communist-controlled "investigations," and they have resorted to extorted confessions. They have done this in an attempt to provide an ostensibly scientific and legal basis for their false charges.

The Communists have staged three so-called investigations:

1. On March 13, 1952, Peiping announced the formation of a so-called "Investigation Commission." This was carefully selected from among Chinese Communists to insure its partiality. Before it began its work, its chairman announced that its purpose was "to gather the various criminal facts on bacteriological warfare waged by the American imperialists."

2. Another so-called investigation was staged by a committee of the Communist front—International Association of Democratic Lawyers. According to *Pravda*, on March 4, 1952, this group was sent out "in order to investigate and establish the crimes committed by the interventionists in Korea, in violation of all international agreements." The Commission was made up of currently faithful followers of the party line. Its chairman, Brandweiner, was also a former Nazi.

3. Last September, the Chinese Communists published a lengthy report of the Communist-sponsored "International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of Facts Concerning Bacteriological Warfare in Korea and China." This group of so-called investigators was organized by a member of the Chinese Communists' Peace Committee. It was composed of Communists or Communist sympathizers. The only member professionally qualified as a scientist for the subject supposedly under investigation was a Soviet epidemiologist, Dr. M. M. Zhukov-Verezhnikov

(U.S.S.R.), Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Medicine. In a speech carried by Soviet newspapers on March 14, 1952 (months before the investigation), he had already announced his judgment:

The American imperialists have perpetrated a new crime. They have carried out a bacteriological attack on the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic and on the Chinese Peoples Republic.

This supposedly scientific body was not only composed of members who had formed their judgments before going to China, but the Commission itself did not even bother to examine the so-called evidence of bacteriological warfare on the spot. For example, Dr. Andrea Andreen stated upon her return to Sweden in September 1952:

We felt so sure of the integrity of our Chinese hosts that we entirely trusted statements which they made regarding American use of germ warfare. The scientific foundation of the Commission's work consisted of the fact that the delegates implicitly believed the Chinese and North Korean accusations and evidence.

"Confessions" in Communist Statecraft

We all know that confessions play an important part in the statecraft of Communist countries. From the earliest purge trials to the present day, the Communists have developed methods for breaking the strongest human spirit and compelling innocent people to confess to any tale which the state authorities may require.

The techniques consist primarily of prolonged deprivation of sleep which in time exerts a toxic effect similar to drugs, spinal injection of truth serum, and enforced maintenance of rigid postures for long periods. Psychological methods are also used: subjecting the prisoner to terrifying mass denunciations; the creation of a sense of isolation and the futility of resistance in the mind of the prisoner; use of fellow prisoners as stool pigeons; alternation of severe and lenient treatment; compelling the prisoner to write hundreds of pages of self-disclosure; and, finally, deceit and trickery. The more orthodox method of beating is also frequently used.

I have looked at the facts of the specific cases which are here generalized, and I admit that these facts shocked me so that I have not felt free to put them before this Committee in detail. I will cite, however, one of the least shocking examples: A Belgian priest, Father Schijns, who was kept in solitary confinement for 6 months by the Chinese Communists in 1951, says:

The sleeplessness, the pain, the total abandonment and isolation, and the headaches brought me gradually to a state of complete hallucination. I began, entirely awake and not dreaming, to see spots and shadows on the walls of my room transformed into wild beasts and war scenes. At times, I found myself weeping aimlessly and senselessly. The psychological effect of such a rigid isolation was that I, just as all the others in our house, finally sat down in front of a typewriter and began to write down confessions hundreds of pages in length. I took the hint to recite the facts about everything that I knew and did,

our work, our cares, our activity. Anyone might read it. It was all patent and well-known. I had only to leave it to my Communist masters to construe misdeeds from these facts.

I turn now to a consideration of the so-called confessions extorted by their Communist captors of American prisoners of war in their hands. It is difficult to approach this question without a feeling of strong emotion and resentment. There of course can be no doubt that a captor, hardened to use of methods such as I have described, would not hesitate to turn these helpless men into tools for their propaganda machine.

Mr. Vyshinsky has recently circulated to the members of this Committee two recent alleged confessions of American military personnel. He is the same Mr. Vyshinsky who stated on November 10, 1952, in this same Committee:

Under conditions of war imprisonment, there is not and cannot be the most minimum conditions for the free expression of the will of any war prisoner.

These so-called confessions are false in their general assertions and in their specific allegations. They are of course in no event entitled to credence. They should be presumed to be false against the background of the circumstances in which they are extorted. However, we need not rely upon a mere presumption of their falsity. We have specific refutation.

These military officers have allegedly identified a certain directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States which is supposed to have instituted a plan for bacteriological warfare in Korea. They have allegedly identified certain military personnel who are said to have participated in meetings for carrying this plan into operation.

There was no such directive, and there were no such meetings.

Statements by American Military Officers

Mr. Chairman, I read to this Committee a statement by Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. The statement was written on March 25. I quote:

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have never made a plan for bacteriological warfare in Korea.

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have never sent a directive to the Commanding General, Far East Command, or any other individual in the Far East, by any means directing the initiation of bacteriological warfare in Korea.

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff categorically deny that any military forces of the United States have engaged in bacteriological warfare in that area including contiguous Chinese territory.

Next, Mr. Chairman, I read this Committee a statement by Maj. Gen. C. F. Schilt, who was Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea from July 1951 to April 1952. This is the responsible officer who commanded the organization which has been alleged, by these latest confessions, to have dropped germ bombs in Korea:

I categorically affirm that the account of bacteriological warfare activity on the part of United Nations and/or United States forces contained therein are complete fabrications. In particular the activities of the First Marine Aircraft Wing which were a matter of intimate knowledge to me in my official capacity at no time participated in bacteriological warfare. None of the statements on the subject attributed to me are true. At no time did I receive or issue any instruction concerning bacteriological warfare nor did I ever attend any conferences or engage in any other planning activities connected with this subject. No special security measures were ever imposed upon the wing or any of its units and during all my service in Korea I never heard of the alleged code word super propaganda (SUPROP).

Next, Mr. Chairman, I read this Committee a statement by Maj. Gen. Clayton C. Jerome who replaced Major General Schilt as Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing and served in that capacity to January 8, 1953:

It's all a damn lie, and I would like to go up to the U.N. and tell them so under oath.

I categorically deny the truthfulness of the accusations contained in the alleged confessions of Col. Schwable and Major Bley that United Nations and/or U. S. Forces planned or participated in bacteriological warfare. As Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing during the period 11 April 1952 to 8 January 1953, I positively state that no orders were received by the First Marine Aircraft Wing or issued to subordinate units of the Wing which related to bacteriological warfare. There were no plans for bacteriological warfare prepared by the First Marine Aircraft Wing. The allegations that I discussed such matters with the 5th Air Force and conducted conferences within the First Marine Aircraft Wing relating to bacteriological warfare are completely false.

Other statements in the two alleged confessions are equally false. I will not burden the Committee by reading the sworn statements of the persons mentioned in these two alleged confessions. I have these statements here, and I now request the Secretary-General to circulate them to the members of the United Nations for their inspection.² In the greatest detail, persons, places, meetings, and activities referred to in the so-called confessions are denied and refuted. The "confessions" emerge as cleverly forged and contrived documents with no substance whatever.

I have described the nature and origins of this Soviet plot. The whole apparatus of a police-state system, centering in the Kremlin, is being used to manufacture and distribute a total lie—false in all its parts, both general and particular.

How should the General Assembly meet this assault upon the United Nations and upon the effort of the United Nations to resist aggression in Korea?

Repeated offers of an impartial investigation of the charges have been made by the United States, by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and by the U.N. Security Council itself. These offers have been ignored, rejected, or vetoed.

² U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.37, dated Mar. 27.

How the U.N. Should Meet the Assault

Despite this fact—or indeed, *because* of it—it seemed to us fitting to submit this question to the General Assembly. It is the U.N. Charter itself which is being subverted by Soviet actions, and we are assembled here as custodians and trustees of the Charter.

I have introduced a resolution on this matter, so that the moral weight and dignity of the General Assembly may be brought to bear. This does, after all, embody the collective judgment of the world community.

We propose, along with all the other nations whose forces are engaged in repelling aggression in Korea, that the General Assembly do now formally take note of the accusations which have been made and repeatedly denied by the Unified Command. We think the Assembly should record the fact that offers of impartial investigation have been rejected by the very persons who originate and disseminate the false charges.

We propose that the General Assembly should now call upon the Governments and authorities concerned to cooperate with a Commission established by the Assembly itself to conduct an impartial investigation of the charges that have been made. The Commission should be allowed to travel freely throughout such areas of North and South Korea, the Chinese mainland, and Japan, as the Commission may think necessary in the performance of its task. It should have freedom of access to such persons, places, and documents as it considers necessary. And it should be free to examine any witness, including prisoners of war.

A special problem is presented by reason of the base Communist practice, which I have described, of using the device of extorted confessions. We feel there is a right way to deal with this matter.

The General Assembly should ask the Communists whether they will submit the so-called confessions to impartial investigations.

We challenge the Communist authorities concerned to permit all United States military personnel, whose so-called confessions have been published, to be brought to a neutral area. There they should be given a fair chance to tell the truth to an impartial U.N. Commission. I ask that they be brought to an area in some country which is neither a participant in the U.N. Command in Korea nor whose Government has supported or approved the action of the aggressors in Korea. There they would remain under the responsibility and custody of the Commission and would be interned until the conclusion of hostilities in order to preclude fear of later reprisals by their Communist captors. After an adequate period of rest and recuperation, they would be informed of the propaganda use which has been made of their alleged "confessions" and asked by the Commission to verify or deny the facts contained therein.

It is for the Soviet delegate to accept this offer, in the name of truth.

We await his reply.

CHARGES BY THE PEIPING RADIO

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 8

Several days ago, in introducing the subject of this debate, the U.S. delegation made clear what our objective was and what it has been from the moment when these false charges became a part of the established Communist propaganda policy. We have since then heard statements by the Soviet representative and by several of the members of the Soviet bloc.

One of the points which has been stressed in all the statements made by the Soviet group, although with varying degrees of emphasis, has been the alleged fault of this Committee in failing to invite the Chinese Communist regime and the North Korean authorities to attend our meetings for the purpose, as it has been put again this afternoon by the Polish representative, of participating in our discussions.

Mr. Chairman, the question has been asked by other speakers before me and I think it only appropriate to ask again what purpose would be served by inviting the Chinese and the North Korean authorities to come here to propagate a lie? There are not two sides to a lie. A lie is an empty thing. It has only one side, an outside. This lie, as we have demonstrated by our highest authorities, by the most responsible officials of the U.S. Government speaking for themselves within their responsibility as representatives of the U.N. Command in Korea, is false in all its generalities and in every particular.

The Chinese Communists and the North Korean authorities have never at any time requested or suggested that an impartial investigation be conducted into the grave charges which they have persisted in leveling against the United States and the United Nations. I do not think it is necessary to speculate concerning the nature of the propaganda and lying testimony which these authorities would engage in if invited to attend our discussions.

On March 30, and I must note as a matter of tragic irony and coincidence, on the same day when Chou En-lai issued a statement regarding the prisoners of war in Korea, on that same day when the hopes of the world were raised, the Peiping Radio commented upon the proposal which I laid before this Committee on behalf of the 16 cosponsors. I should like to explain to the Committee in the words of the Peiping broadcast the attitude which the Chinese Communist authorities take in what I think may fairly be characterized as a desperate attempt to evade an impartial investigation.

Speaking before the Political Committee had before it the proposed composition of the committee of investigation, before any names had been suggested for inclusion in the draft resolution, Peiping Radio characterized the proposal that the General Assembly set up a commission to conduct what it called a so-called impartial investigation and a commission which would have free access to areas necessary to its investigation, and said such a so-called commission—and I point out that the membership of the Commission had not then yet been suggested—that such a so-called commission could more suitably be termed a special detachment of the United States intelligence to collect information about germ warfare waged by the American Forces. And the Peiping Radio went on to say that it is quite obvious that the U.S. Government, which is still continuing bacteriological warfare, is in urgent need of first-hand information concerning the results of this warfare.

This is the manner in which the Peiping Radio characterized a solemn and dignified proposal for the creation of an impartial commission and attacked and undermined a commission whose composition had not even at that point been suggested.

With regard to our proposal, which is contained in this draft resolution, to turn over to the commission the prisoners of war who are alleged to have made confessions, the Peiping Radio on that same day characterized this proposal as a desperate attempt—to use their language—to get these prisoners of war handed over to a commission which is in the exclusive service of the U.S. Government. Again I remind the Committee the members of the commission had not even then been named or proposed.

The Peiping Radio went on to say that the “United States Gestapo”—to use their language—could then employ threat and persuasion for the so-called repudiation of these prisoners of war. In other words, it is a move directed toward coercing them to repudiate their own depositions. By this attempt to use such a shameful dodge, Peiping Radio said, to get a repudiation of the confessions made by the captured U.S. Air Force officers the U.S. Government fools nobody. On the contrary, it only proves that the U.S. Government is at its wits end and can find no way of evading the grave responsibility for using bacterial weapons.

This is the language of the Chinese Communist authorities on March 30. Do we need to speculate further concerning the nature of the statements which would be made if their representatives were invited to participate in our deliberations?

Mr. Chairman, what the U.S. Government has proposed from the beginning and what we now urgently continue to maintain is not a discussion, not a debate, but an investigation. Impartial experts who would be selected by the commission proposed in this resolution would work with mi-

croscopes, not with microphones. This is not a propaganda maneuver. This is an honest and practical device to expose charges which I think all the world knows to be false.

Reference has been made to what I think has been called the moderate tone of the Soviet representative in dealing with this subject yesterday. Mr. Chairman, it is somewhat startling that when the Soviet representative whispers, to hear the echoes shout back. The tone which we have heard from other spokesmen has not been as moderate and restrained as the whispers of the Soviet representative. However, we feel that a lie is just as false whether it is whispered or shouted.

In an attempt to evade the investigation—and this repeats a performance with which we have become familiar and which we saw last summer in the Security Council—the Soviet representative and his louder echoes have referred to the Geneva Protocol and to the desirability of ratifying the Geneva Protocol.

Mr. Chairman, whose good faith is on trial here? We are urging an impartial investigation and an honest method which we know—and say with a sense of responsibility—will expose a lie. Now, why does the Soviet representative intro-

duce the subject of the Geneva Protocol? It has nothing to do with the truth or the falsity of the charges of germ warfare. It is, therefore, an evasion of the point at issue here, a pretext for evading our suggestion for an investigation. The question of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol relates to a quite different, although a very important matter; that is, what is the most practical, effective, and honest method of eliminating bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from national arsenals.

The Geneva Protocol does not meet the need of the present difficult world for security against the use of bacteriological weapons. The protocol merely collects promises not to use poison gas and bacteriological weapons *first*. If every member of the United Nations were to sign the Geneva Protocol and ratify it today, the Soviet Government having already hurled the lie about the United Nations use of germ warfare in Korea would be free under its own reservations to the Geneva Protocol to use germ warfare against any U.N. member. There is no security in such an arrangement.

The Geneva Protocol permits the continued manufacture and stockpiling of bacteriological

Draft Resolution on Impartial Investigation of Germ Warfare Charges*

U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.36/Rev.2
Adopted April 8, 1953

The General Assembly,

Noting that accusations have been made by certain governments and authorities charging the use of bacteriological warfare by United Nations forces, and that the Unified Command for Korea has repeatedly denied such charges,

Recalling that when the charges were first made the Unified Command for Korea requested that an impartial investigation be made of them.

Noting that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities have so far refused to accept an offer by the International Committee of the Red Cross to carry out an investigation,

Noting that the draft resolution submitted in the Security Council by the Government of the United States proposing an investigation of these charges by the International Committee of the Red Cross failed to carry because of the negative vote of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Desiring to serve the interests of truth,

1. *Resolves* that, after the President of the General Assembly has received an indication from all the governments and authorities concerned of their acceptance of the investigation proposed in this resolution, a Commission composed of Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, Sweden, and Uruguay shall be set up and shall carry out immediately an investigation of the charges that have been made;

2. *Calls upon* the governments and authorities concerned to enable the Commission to travel freely throughout such areas of North and South Korea, the Chinese mainland, and Japan as the Commission may deem necessary in the performance of its task

and to allow the Commission freedom of access to such persons, places and relevant documents as it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its task and to allow it to examine any witness including prisoners of war under such safeguards and conditions as the Commission shall determine: all prisoners of war who are alleged to have made confessions regarding the use of bacteriological warfare shall, prior to examination by the Commission, be taken to a neutral area and remain under the responsibility and custody of the Commission until the end of the Korean hostilities;

3. *Requests* the President of the General Assembly to transmit this resolution immediately to the governments and authorities concerned requesting them to indicate their acceptance of the investigation proposed in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the President of the General Assembly to report to the General Assembly at the earliest practicable date on the results of his efforts;

5. *Directs* the Commission, when set up, to enlist the aid of such scientists of international reputation, especially epidemiologists, and such other experts as it may select;

6. *Directs* the Commission, after acceptance of the investigation proposed in this resolution by all the governments and authorities concerned, to report to the Members of the General Assembly through the Secretary-General as soon as possible and no later than 1 September 1953;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish the Commission with the necessary staff and facilities.

*Sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States; adopted by Committee I on April 8 by a vote of 52-5-3.

weapons. It does not provide for international control to prevent facilities for waging mass germ warfare from becoming a part of the armaments of nations.

U.S. Proposal on Disarmament

We think, and we have advised the Disarmament Commission of our view in this regard and this view has been supported, that the Disarmament Commission should continue its work for the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and coordinated plans providing for the elimination and prohibition of all major weapons, including bacteriological, adaptable to mass destruction.³ That is what the General Assembly resolution provides, which we voted on this very morning.⁴ Within the Disarmament Commission we have repeatedly stated our desire to provide for effective, honest international control of bacteriological weapons. We have pointed out that safeguards must be devised to insure the elimination of bacteriological weapons, their facilities and appliances for their production and their use. We regard it essential that there be an effective and continuous system of disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including the weapons of mass destruction.

This is our program laid before the Disarmament Commission, a program to which my Government is pledged and dedicated to further and to develop, we hope, to a successful conclusion.

It, therefore, seems clear to my Government as we come close to a vote on the draft resolution before us that the procedure we suggest is honest, that the commission we propose is fair, and that there is no logical or sensible reason to be found in evasions.

I challenge the Soviet representative, reminding him that these charges have been made in Moscow, have been disseminated by Moscow, to state whether his Government is prepared to support an impartial investigation of the charges which the Moscow Radio and the Communist newspapers of the Soviet Union have propagated and disseminated. And I ask him whether the countries proposed for the commission to conduct this impartial investigation—Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, Sweden, and Uruguay—can be stigmatized and slandered?

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we should proceed with the resolution. I am confident that the overwhelming majority of the members of this Committee will support a procedure which we know will result in an exposure of an infamous lie.

³ For a résumé of U.S. proposals on disarmament, see *ibid.*, Mar. 30, 1953, p. 477.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 584.

Trygve Lie's Work Praised; Welcome Extended to his Successor

*Statements by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*

Tribute to Trygve Lie

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 7

On behalf of the Government of the United States, I wish to express appreciation for the work of the retiring Secretary-General, Trygve Lie.¹ During his more than 7 years of service to the United Nations he has given of himself unreservedly to promote the ideals of the Charter. His difficult task he has carried out with courage, with energy, and with devotion.

Mr. Lie has generally been regarded as a symbol of the United Nations. The Preparatory Commission in London in 1945 prophesied that the United Nations could not prosper nor its aims be realized without the active and steadfast support of the peoples of the world, and that the Secretary-General more than anyone else would stand for the United Nations as a whole in the eyes of the world. Mr. Lie has recognized the responsibility that this concept placed upon his shoulders and he said, himself, some years later: "The office I happen to hold—the office of Secretary-General—stands for the hopes for peace and civilization that are bound up in the United Nations."

It was Mr. Lie's task to set up the organization at the very start and to make it a going concern. His was the task of establishing the precedents which might guide his successors. He has done this in a manner which has enhanced the dignity of his office. He has not failed to look beyond the immediate problem to the future and he has taken the initiative in presenting his views on long-range planning for the United Nations.

The great test of the United Nations itself came when the organization was faced with the attack in Korea. The issue was whether the organization itself should survive or should perish. Within 15 hours after the Secretary-General was informed that a conflict appeared to have broken out in Korea, he courageously stated his views to the Security Council. Having asked for a report from the U.N. Commission in Korea, he told the Security Council on June 25, 1950, that the situation was in his view a serious one and a threat to international peace, and he said: "The Security Council is, in my opinion, competent to deal with it. I consider it is the clear duty of the Security Council to take steps necessary to re-establish peace in that area."

The 7 years of Mr. Lie's Secretary-Generalship have presented him with the problems of moving

¹ Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden was elected by the General Assembly on Apr. 7 to succeed Mr. Lie as Secretary-General.

the headquarters of the organization from one temporary location to another—from the Henry Hudson Hotel to Hunter College, then to Lake Success, and finally to the new Headquarters building in which we sit. It was a long way from Church House in London, where the Preparatory Commission met, to this Headquarters building. It could be said that in a way this headquarters is a monument to Mr. Lie, because under his guidance it came into being.

However, I suggest that a monument to his work lies not in stone and glass and mortar. The United Nations is neither one building nor another. It is the peoples of the world here meeting through their representatives on the basis of Charter principles. From his first report to the General Assembly to his last, Mr. Lie has seen what the United Nations really is. He said in June of 1946² that it is a machinery through which nations can cooperate; that it can be used and developed in the light of its activities and experience to the untold benefit of humanity or it can be discarded and broken. And in his last report to us in September of 1952 he stated that so long as the United Nations exists and functions we can keep alive the hope and continue the effort for peaceful adjustments, for workable bases of coexistence, and even ultimately for the reconciliation of what today may seem unreconcilable.

I suggest that the true monument to Mr. Lie is his stated conviction and belief in the principles of the U.N. Charter.

It could not be an easy task for a man of principle and integrity to attempt to administer an organization composed as it is today of 60 members. Differences of opinion are bound to arise and are to be expected. Mr. Lie's position reminds me of the two lines in John Gilpin's ride:

And those behind cried "Forward,"
And those in front cried "Back."

As he takes leave of us, Mr. Lie should have the satisfaction of knowing that his is a job well-done. He has not only the grateful thanks of the U.S. Government—the best wishes of the American people go with him also.

Welcome to Dag Hammarskjöld

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 10

It is a pleasure to welcome on behalf of the United States, Dag Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General. He is, of course, no stranger to the United Nations, having represented his Government here at this very session.

As Secretary-General he will hold a key position in an organization to which my Government attaches the greatest importance. The Secretary-General, together with his staff, comprises what the charter calls a principal organ of the United Nations.

² U.N. doc. A/2141.

Sweden has a great tradition of service by her citizens in international affairs. Mr. Hammarskjöld's father, in addition to serving his country as its Prime Minister and as a judge, has worked, written, and taught in the field of international law and international organization. His father is also the President of the Nobel Foundation, that body which carries on the aspirations of another great Swede, Alfred Nobel. We all cherish the memory of Count Folke Bernadotte who, as a U.N. Mediator, laid down his life in the service of the United Nations.

In keeping with this tradition, it is most appropriate that Mr. Hammarskjöld, himself a most distinguished citizen of Sweden, should be Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The role of the United Nations and therefore the role of the Secretary-General is as broad as the entire field of human endeavor. We are fortunate that Mr. Hammarskjöld brings to it not only his skill as a diplomat and as a minister, but also his broad experience in economic and financial matters. All these talents directly relate to important fields of U.N. work.

As Mr. Hammarskjöld takes up his duties he becomes part of a living organization which has gone further toward organizing peace and organizing security than any other body in modern history, and this result has occurred at a time of great threats to the peace and the security of the international community.

Today no state can be an island. A web of interrelations must exist between it and other states.

Today an international organization must represent different cultures and different races, although a little over 100 years ago the Council of Europe was conceived as a group of sovereigns, products of the same civilization and background, maintaining the stability of Europe.

Today, as then, we must expect conflict among people and among states. But that does not mean that this conflict need be physical. Shifting tides of power among men and among nations can be tested by quick access to world public opinion. That is what the United Nations provides.

From his post the Secretary-General will be able to see whether the technical advances of pure science can be balanced through corresponding advances in the means by which men and nations can live in peace with their neighbors. To this quest he can contribute.

No one would tell Mr. Hammarskjöld that his work will be easy. His problems will be even more numerous than the 60 members of the United Nations, and as one problem is resolved, others will appear to take its place. . . .

Mr. Secretary-General . . . my Government is happy to have cast its vote in favor of placing this organization—this instrumentality for peace and security—in your custody.

Maintaining Charter Standards for International Civil Servants

Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 28

Let us begin by paying tribute to Secretary-General Lie and to the important and efficient work done by the staff members of the Secretariat in this, as well as in past, Assemblies. In 1950, and again in this General Assembly, I have observed the fine efforts of the men and women who selflessly and anonymously serve us in our search for peace.

It is sometimes forgotten that the task undertaken by Mr. Lie in the organizational period of the United Nations was nothing short of monumental. That he brought together a staff which met the needs of governments, which were holding hundreds of meetings, stands to his everlasting credit. I have every confidence that the U.N. Secretariat will continue to provide for the needs of this international organization with increasing efficiency.

Mr. Lie, in his statement before this Assembly,² gave a full report on the problems he has had to face in a period of world trouble. He dealt in some detail with his relationships with some of the member governments. My own remarks will deal less with the past than with the present and future.

The position of the U.S. Government on this question is determined by the importance of the United Nations in American foreign policy. President Eisenhower in his inaugural speech described the United Nations as "the living sign of all peoples' hopes for peace We shall strive to make it not merely an eloquent symbol but an effective force." This is the basic instruction of the U.S. delegation.

If the United Nations is to be an effective force, it must have the full support of world public

opinion. Public opinion and moral force are the strength of the Organization. We have seen, in the past, the weight of public opinion in bringing questions to issue and settlement in the United Nations.

World public opinion is, in large part, the combined public opinion in the several member states. Public opinion in the United States is concerned that the effectiveness of the United Nations may be impaired because of the existence of a serious personnel problem. Senator Wiley, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, summed up the general view in the United States when he said, "There is absolutely no place in the international secretariat for a single American Communist or any American of doubtful loyalty." And later on, "the United Nations should not become a haven for disloyal Americans or for espionage."

As I said upon presenting my credentials to the Secretary-General, this essentially administrative problem has been one of the principal obstacles in the United States to increased confidence in the United Nations.

The Secretary-General has demonstrated that he, also, is fully cognizant of the fact that the United Nations effectiveness is profoundly influenced by the extent of public faith and confidence in the Secretariat.

It is because of the fundamental importance of this problem that the following steps have been taken:

First: The Secretary-General has dismissed the individuals whose actions he regarded as a failure to meet the fundamental obligations of international civil servants.

Second: He asked the U.S. Government to furnish him with full information concerning both present and prospective U.S. members of his staff so that he can insure that the Charter standards are met.

¹ Made on Mar. 28 in plenary session on the Report of the Secretary-General on Personnel Policy.

² For a summary of Trygve Lie's statement of Mar. 10, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1953, p. 452.

Third: The U.S. Government has agreed to undertake investigations necessary to supply the needed information.

Fourth: These investigations are now in process.

You have before you in the Report of the Secretary-General³ the procedures which are being followed by the U.S. Government in conducting these investigations. Although some modification may be necessary from time to time to assure that U.S. employees or applicants for the United Nations are accorded the same protection as employees of or applicants for the U.S. federal service, the primary concern here is that the advice provided to the Secretary-General by the U.S. Government will be based on a thorough inquiry into the facts and that the U.S. Government regards the information provided *only* as advice. While we hope that the information so provided will prove adequate to permit the Secretary-General responsibly to reach conclusions similar to those reached by the U.S. Government, we recognize that the responsibility for final judgment in the matter rests solely with the Secretary-General.

The investigations are proceeding rapidly. Nearly 1,800 investigation forms have been filed, and investigators are currently working on most of these cases. I am confident that most of these investigations will have been completed in the next few months and that the Secretary-General will have been furnished the information he has asked of the U.S. Government by the next regular session of the General Assembly.

The U.S. Government considers that the issues raised in the last few months can be satisfactorily met within the spirit of the Charter by the procedures which the Secretary-General indicates in his report he will follow in reviewing the information to be supplied and by the action he proposes to take on cases where the information discloses the individual is engaging in or is likely to engage in subversive activities.

Protecting Individual Employees

These procedures do not lose sight of the necessity of protecting the individual employee from unjust accusation and arbitrary action. We fully share the concern that many of you have expressed both privately and publicly that the independence of the Secretariat must be maintained. We recognize that, in order to do so, employees cannot be penalized simply because they do not personally agree with the policies of the particular regime in power in their country of citizenship. We have no interest in knowing whether any American in the Secretariat is Republican or Democrat or Independent, so long as he meets the Charter standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. However, we do have an interest in knowing

³ U.N. doc. A/2364 dated Jan. 30.

whether he is a member of a conspiracy dedicated to the forcible overthrow of our democratic form of government—and undoubtedly most of you have a similar interest.

Since the power of selection resides solely in the Secretary-General and since it seems clear to us from the Secretary-General's Report that the standards he proposes to apply will protect staff members against inadequately supported or unreliable representations from member governments, there should be no doubt as to the continued independence of the Secretariat or the safeguarding of individual rights.

Consequently, the U.S. delegation believes the Secretary-General should continue to apply the policies outlined in his report.

Of course, it is probable that all delegations find certain points of emphasis or detail in the Report of the Secretary-General with which they may disagree. There are a number of aspects which the United States believes could be improved by amendments. But we consider the Report as a whole to be acceptable.

Further, some delegations have expressed the view that there should be a full discussion of the possibility of a fundamental revision of the Charter provisions relating to the Secretariat. We certainly are not opposed to such a discussion. But such a discussion has no direct bearing on the practical situation we face, which is that the Secretary-General is meeting the problem before him in an effective and forthright manner and should not be prevented from working out a full solution.

The U.S. delegation believes this Assembly should take no action which will hinder the Secretary-General in taking whatever action may be necessary to deal with the existing situation. But, of course, the United States has no objection—in fact we welcome it—a further discussion of this question at the Eighth Session of the General Assembly, such discussion to take fully into account the developments during the intervening period.

In order to accomplish these two purposes, the U.S. delegation has joined with other delegations in sponsoring a draft resolution which is before you for consideration.⁴ The U.S. delegation for the same reasons will vote against the resolution proposed by several other delegations, which proposes to suspend any further action on personnel questions while a detailed study is made by a committee of 15 members. We consider that such action by the General Assembly would make it impossible for the Secretary-General to deal adequately with the personnel problems confronting the Organization.

Reverting to the Secretary-General's Report for a moment, there are two questions which have been

⁴ U.N. doc. A/L. 146, dated Mar. 28. The resolution is sponsored, in addition to the United States, by France and the United Kingdom.

directed to me in private discussion on which comment might be appropriate.

A question has been raised about the conclusion of the Secretary-General's Report that a refusal, on the ground of possible self-incrimination, to testify before public investigatory bodies may be held to be inconsistent with the obligations of staff members. Let me, therefore, speak briefly about the privilege against self-incrimination.

Resolution on Personnel Policy*

U.N. doc. A/Resolution 95
Adopted April 1, 1953

The General Assembly,
Recalling the following provisions of Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter:

Article 100

"1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

"2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101

"1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

"3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible",
and

Having reviewed and considered the report of the Secretary-General on personnel policy (A/2364),

1. *Expresses its confidence* that the Secretary-General will conduct personnel policy with these considerations in mind;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its eighth session a report on the progress made in the conduct and development of personnel policy, together with the comments of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions thereon;

3. *Invites* the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to submit, after appropriate consultations with the administrative heads of the specialized agencies, their recommendations as to any further action that may be required of the General Assembly;

4. *Calls upon* all Members of the United Nations to assist the Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities as chief administrative officer of the United Nations.

**Adopted by the General Assembly on Apr. 1 by a vote of 41-13-4.*

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Many of the nations represented here share with my country a common tradition of the rule of law and of jealous concern for the protection of the rights of individuals against invasion by arbitrary governmental power. But the conditions and the manner in which this protection is provided often vary.

The privilege of witnesses to refuse testimony to legislative bodies is a case in point. In many, perhaps in a number of countries legislative bodies are not generally granted the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of records and to compel testimony under oath in aid of independent investigations. Where such powers are rare, or unknown, the refusal of a citizen to cooperate in an investigation may well be regarded as an assertion of a simple right. In such a situation, to draw inference from the refusal to testify may appear questionable.

In the United States, however, the position of an uncooperative witness is quite different. The power of the legislature and its committees to make independent investigations and to exercise the ancillary powers necessary thereto is well established and fully recognized both in the written Constitution and by custom. This power is a necessary consequence of our constitutional system with its strict separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. To exercise its responsibilities, the legislature must be able to assure itself of access to the information it needs directly from the community. Lacking the power of parliamentary legislatures where executive and legislative functions coexist in the same people, it need not rely merely on information made available to it by the Cabinet. This independent power of the legislature to ascertain facts has been recognized to be not an invasion of liberty, but an essential guaranty of that liberty and of democracy. It is in fact broader and less limited than the corresponding powers vested in the executive. It springs from our system of separation of powers which, I believe, exists in no other nation to the extent that it exists here.

Accordingly, the obligation to cooperate with legislative investigations and to make available the information required by legislative bodies is recognized as a fundamental obligation of American citizenship.

The privilege against self-incrimination is directed primarily at court proceedings and does not excuse the citizen from his obligation to disclose information to a legislative committee. The main purpose of the privilege is the protection of the individual against being compelled to disclose facts which may put him in jeopardy of criminal prosecution. But it may not be invoked as a means of giving effect to a general objection to any given investigation, its subject matter, its methods, or the persons conducting it.

Thus it is no violation of any "right" of Americans in the Secretariat if the Secretary-General takes a grave view of failure to respond to legitimate questions by U.S. legislative bodies, particularly if the inquiry is concerned with possible subversive activities affecting the very safety of the United States. We do not think any citizen has a "right" to hold public office; we consider such tenure to be a privilege.

In his Report, the Secretary-General does not propose to ignore the nature of the questions asked or to disregard the other information concerning the individual which may have been made available to him in determining the consequences of a refusal to testify. I hope that what I have said about the obligation of Americans to cooperate with public investigations may have helped to demonstrate that the Secretary-General's position is not only consistent with law but is a policy which fairly takes into account these considerations about Americans who fear self-incrimination when asked about subversion in the United States.

Estimating Personnel Performance

The second question relates to paragraphs 97, 98, and 99 which state in part: "The Secretary-General should not retain a staff member in the employment of the United Nations if he has reasonable grounds for believing that that staff member is engaging or is likely to engage in subversive activities against the government of any member state." While this statement and the accompanying text seem to me to be clear and unequivocal, I have heard reservations about the policy of refusing employment to individuals on grounds of "the likelihood of engaging in subversive activities." This is because it is held to be almost impossible to make such a determination with any degree of accuracy. The U. S. Government believes that, as in the case of judging any other factor of probable personnel performance, one must look at the individual's past record. Admittedly it is a difficult decision but no more difficult than an attempt to appraise the courage and leadership qualities of a soldier or the ability of a diplomat to respect confidences. All human actions which include an appraisal of the future are estimates of likelihood. No one is ever hired for any job without an estimate of his probable future performance. There are no absolutes of judgment, but, if the guide is past performance, the prediction is likely to be accurate. The procedures established by the U. S. Government and by the Secretary-General assure objectivity and fairness in reaching these decisions. It is for this purpose that the U. S. Government is investigating the background, employment history, and character of present and prospective U. S. citizen staff members not only as regards loyalty but also the probability of competent performance. We

wish to provide the Secretary-General with information on the basis of which he can make as informed a judgment as possible on this point.

In summary, Mr. President, the position of the United States is: The U. S. Government does not believe that persons engaged or who, based on their past and present record, seem likely to engage in subversive activities against any member state should be employed in an international organization. We will do all in our power to provide the Secretary-General with the information necessary to enable him to make a determination on this matter. This does not constitute, nor is it intended to constitute, dictation to the Secretary-General or other member governments. It is a service to the United Nations in the interest of maintaining a Secretariat which measures up to standards established in the Charter for international civil servants.

We, therefore, commend the policies adopted by the Secretary-General as measures designed to strengthen the Secretariat and the United Nations itself to meet the challenges which face us in the unknown future. In our view, these policies deserve a fair trial. The Secretary-General and the U. S. Government will require time and support to make them effective. The General Assembly will be able to judge the value of the policy by their results. World public opinion as well as U. S. public opinion will have an opportunity to judge the results. I am confident that these policies will prove themselves in the main test. They will serve to make the United Nations an effective force.

Accordingly, I urge you to approve the draft resolution of which my delegation is a co-sponsor.

Greece Unifies Exchange System

The Government of Greece has consulted the International Monetary Fund on unification of its exchange system.

Effective April 9, Greece eliminated all multiple currency practices and adjusted the official exchange rate from 15,000 drachmas per U.S. dollar to 30,000 drachmas per U.S. dollar.

The Fund welcomes and concurs in the action proposed by the Greek Government to unify its exchange system by the elimination of its multiple currency practices and adjustment of the Greek official exchange rate.

The Fund notes that this unification of the exchange system has been made possible by the determination of the Greek Government to achieve monetary stability through the pursuance of an internal stabilization program. The Fund considers that these policies should contribute to the further development of the Greek economy, but wishes to emphasize the importance of continuing firm anti-inflationary measures.

The United States in the United Nations

[April 2-15]

General Assembly

By a secret vote of 57-1-1, the General Assembly on April 7 confirmed the Security Council's recommendation for the appointment of Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden as the new U.N. Secretary-General. He was sworn in on April 10.

At the April 7 meeting, V. K. Krishna Menon of India referred to the developments in Korea and expressed the hope that the U.N. Command would keep the United Nations informed of the status of negotiations. At the request of President Pearson, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., reported briefly on behalf of the Unified Command on the recent events that had encouraged "all of us who seek peace in Korea." (For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1953, p. 574.)

On April 8 the Assembly voted 52-5 (Soviets)-3 to continue the Disarmament Commission, after accepting a Soviet amendment deleting from the text a commendation of the Commission's work. Another Soviet proposal to omit a reference to the General Assembly resolution establishing the Commission was rejected by a vote of 10-33 (U.S.)-13.

The Czechoslovak resolution condemning alleged U.S. interference in the internal affairs of certain states was rejected, 5-41-14.

Committee I (Political and Security)—By a vote of 52-5 (Soviet bloc)-3 (Burma, India, Indonesia), the Committee on April 8 adopted the joint resolution establishing a commission composed of Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, Sweden, and Uruguay to make an impartial inquiry into charges of the use of germ warfare. (For text, see p. 617.)

General debate on the Polish omnibus item opened on April 9, with Stanislaw Skrzesewski (Poland) as first speaker. He explained that the recent Communist Chinese and North Korean proposals offered a basis for the solution of the Korean and related problems, and he therefore introduced a revised text of the original Polish draft to take into account the changed state of affairs. The revised version recommended "the immediate resumption of truce negotiations . . . it being understood that . . . the parties will

exert every effort to reach agreement on the question of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war and . . . of prisoners of war as a whole, endeavoring thereby to remove the obstacles preventing the termination of the war in Korea."

Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) then made a lengthy speech during which he declared that the Soviet Union still adhered to the principle that all prisoners must be repatriated, regardless of their desires. He further stated that the U.S.S.R. recognized the fairness and justice of Chou En-lai's proposal that prisoners resisting repatriation should be sent to a neutral country (BULLETIN of Apr. 13, 1953, p. 526). He emphasized his country's desire for peace and the incompatibility of NATO with this objective, as had the Polish representative. Mr. Vyshinsky also endorsed the remaining part of the Polish resolution, which called for a one-third reduction of all armed forces and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons; called upon states which had not done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925; asked the General Assembly to declare participation in NATO incompatible with U.N. membership; and called for a five-power "peace" pact.

Commenting briefly, Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) said the Vyshinsky speech was reminiscent of a past which the new Soviet leaders profess was a bygone past. The Soviet intervention seemed to him stale, dull, and regressive. As for the Polish text, it contained only all the old slogans which the Soviet Union had offered at previous sessions—no more and no less.

Speaking again on April 10, Ambassador Gross told the Committee that U.N. debate on a Korean armistice at the present time would not facilitate the Panmunjom negotiations. He attributed the current conciliatory Soviet gestures to the West's policy of strength and unity and declared the Polish proposals would contribute nothing to the quest for agreement.

On April 14, the Brazilian delegation circulated a draft resolution noting with satisfaction that agreement had been reached on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war in Korea, expressing hope that the exchange would promptly be effected and that further negotiations at Pan-

munjom would result in an early armistice, and proposing to recess the present session after completion of current agenda items until the signing of an armistice or other developments in Korea require Assembly consideration.

Henrique de Souza Gomes (Brazil) on April 15 offered a clarification of the motives behind his delegation's proposal. In view of the recent change in the international atmosphere, it seemed necessary to reevaluate the situation and to explore every possible means likely to alleviate present world tensions. He cautioned, however, that it would be futile to ignore the very serious divergencies still prevalent.

The Brazilian draft singled out the problem of the Korean armistice because the delegation thought this was the most "burning" question, which at the same time held the highest hopes of settlement, he explained. He added that this settlement was an essential step in preventing a new world war or the extension of present conflicts. A "modest" approach between despair and unwarranted optimism guided the delegation in its desire to enunciate certain points which had found unanimous support.

Mr. Vyshinsky, after renewing his delegation's attack on NATO and on Western disarmament proposals and noting that the U.N. commander in Korea had not yet replied to the Communists' request for the resumption of peace talks, said that the Brazilian draft was worthy of the most careful study and attention.

Ambassador Gross (U.S.) refuted the familiar charges as to NATO and disarmament; he then welcomed Mr. Vyshinsky's apparent intention to support the Brazilian proposal, which the United States also endorsed.

Economic and Social Council

The Council on April 2 adopted in four separate votes the U.S. resolution requesting the Secretary-General to invite Libya, Spain, Nepal, and the Republic of Korea to attend the Conference on the Limitation of the Production of Opium scheduled to begin May 11. The invitations to Libya and Nepal were approved unanimously; that to Spain by a vote of 13-4 (U.S.S.R., Poland, Uruguay, Yugoslavia)-1 (India); and that to the Republic of Korea by a vote of 14-2 (U.S.S.R., Poland)-2 (India, Yugoslavia).

Walter Kotschnig (U.S.) on April 6 introduced a resolution on international cooperation on cartography, noting the Secretary-General's report and the efforts made by governments to stimulate accurate surveying and mapping of their territories. The draft requested continuance of the Secretary-General's consultations regarding the holding of regional cartographic conferences and also the submission in due course of a report to

the Council on such consultations. Mr. Kotschnig explained that the United States felt that priority should be given to poorly mapped areas, especially Asia, the Far East, and the Middle East. Work already under way by a Pan American body met the needs of Latin America, he added, indicating that this region would not require U.N. interest.

India suggested an amendment to the U.S. text which would provide for the Secretary-General's consultations to cover also the adoption of a standard method of writing geographic names on maps. Following U.S. acceptance of the Indian amendment, the draft was approved by a vote of 15-2 (U.S.S.R., Poland)-1 (Belgium).

Other resolutions adopted on April 6 included a U.K. draft asking further work on the International Map of the World on the Millionth Scale and a proposal that Ecosoc should grant the freedom-of-information rapporteur's request for access to communications dealing with freedom of information.

On April 9 the Council completed action on the trade-union-rights item by approving a five-part U.K.-Swedish proposal providing, among other things, for automatic referral of complaints concerning ILO members to the ILO Governing Body for consideration, noting the U.S.S.R. failure to cooperate in answering allegations, reiterating a request to Spain and Rumania to cooperate, dismissing the allegation concerning Trieste as not meriting further examination, and inviting the competent authorities of the Saar to submit observations on a new allegation.

At the same session, Mr. Wadsworth announced that the United States was unable to grant permission to representatives of the Women's International Democratic Federation and the World Federation of Trade Unions to enter the United States for the purpose of attending U.N. sessions. Following is the text of his statement:

I am instructed by my Government to state that it has found it impossible to grant the recent application of Mrs. Margaret Luckock, a representative of the Women's International Democratic Federation, and Mr. Jan Dessau, a representative of the World Federation of Trade Unions, for admission to the United States to attend sessions of United Nations bodies, including the Economic and Social Council, at United Nations Headquarters in New York. In denying these applications, my Government has found it necessary to invoke the right to safeguard its security which it reserved to itself in Section 6 of the Joint Resolution (Public Law 357) of the 80th Congress, which authorized the United States to enter into the Headquarters Agreement, and in the note of its Representative, dated November 21, 1947, bringing the Headquarters Agreement into effect. My Government is communicating with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in reply to his inquiry dated March 19, 1953 concerning the application of Mrs. Luckock.

I wish to assure you that, in denying these visa applications, my Government has acted only after the most careful consideration and in full recognition of the responsibilities which it has assumed towards the United Nations.

A U.S. draft resolution deferring decision on a U.N. narcotics laboratory pending study before Ecosoc's 18th session by an expert committee and the Narcotics Commission was approved on April 10. At the same meeting, the Commission confirmed members of functional commissions and agreed unanimously to invite Italy to accede to the Convention on the Death of Missing Persons.

Eugene Black, president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, presented the bank's annual report on April 14, and five resolutions relating to the Population Commission's work were approved. At the next day's meeting, the Council considered two reports of the Technical Assistance Committee and approved the resolution deciding that the new method of obtaining payment toward the living costs of experts recommended by the TAC should be substituted for the existing one not later than January 1954.

Proposals for Agreement on Cartel Practices

Press release 175 dated April 6

The *Ad Hoc* Committee on Restrictive Business Practices of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) has released its report containing the Committee's proposals for an international agreement to prevent harmful cartel practices.¹ The report, which has been under preparation for over a year, will provide the basis for further discussions by the Council at its 16th session this summer.

The Committee proposes that countries agree to take action and cooperate with each other to prevent restrictive business practices affecting international trade having demonstrably harmful effects. These practices would be subject to inquiry upon complaint to determine whether such harmful effects were present. Practices involved would, for example, include agreements among competing business firms to abide by certain prices, not to make or sell more than specified amounts, or not to sell in specified geographic areas.

The Committee, operating as a group of experts, has had the assignment of preparing these proposals for the consideration of governments. The Ecosoc discussions should reveal whether these proposals form the basis for the negotiation of an international agreement acceptable to governments. Governments will use the interval between now and the summer session of Ecosoc to review the report. This interval will provide an opportunity for discussion of its contents with interested U.S. groups.

The Committee was established by resolution of Ecosoc in the summer of 1951.² This resolution,

which was introduced by the United States, recommended to members of the United Nations that

they take appropriate measures and cooperate with each other, to prevent . . . business practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade, on the economic development of underdeveloped areas, or on standards of living.

The Committee, consisting of representatives of Belgium, Canada, France, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay, was established to develop proposals as to methods to be adopted by international agreement to implement this recommendation.

The U.S. position has been that this sort of trade restriction should be eliminated. Healthy and active competition provides a spur for lower costs, lower prices, and higher productivity, which in turn lead to greater trade and increasing standards of living. In this Government's view, restrictive business practices can have harmful effects on international trade similar to those of governmental barriers such as quotas and excessive tariffs. In proposing to Ecosoc that this action be taken, the United States had in mind that such practices often cannot be dealt with effectively by one nation alone under its own domestic laws, and that therefore supplementary international action is needed to cope with the portions of the problem which lie beyond a single country's jurisdiction.

The Committee held sessions in January, April, and September of last year. Its final session started on January 12 of this year and continued through February 21. In summary, the plan which the Committee has developed provides that, on the complaint of any country, a practice alleged to have harmful effects would be subject to inquiry in order to determine whether such effects actually exist. This determination would be made in the light of facts submitted by governments. These facts would be obtained by each government in accordance with its own procedures and would be assembled for analysis. Representatives of governments participating in the agreement would determine on the basis of this analysis whether the practice complained of had a harmful effect in the light of the objectives of the agreement. If they so found, the governments concerned would be requested to take remedial action.

The governments participating in the agreement would undertake to adopt measures by legislation or otherwise to carry out the purposes of the agreement. Each government would further agree to take full account of the findings and recommendations transmitted to it concerning specific business practices, to take the action it considered appropriate, having regard to its obligations under the agreement, and, if in any instance it did not act, to state the grounds for its inaction.

The agreement would apply to the business practices of commercial enterprises whether publicly

¹ U.N. doc. E/2380, E/AC. 37/3.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 595.

or privately owned. It would not apply to business practices specifically required by governments, but, where some governments impose such a requirement and others do not the agreement might be applied at the discretion of the participating countries. Moreover, the effects of such governmentally imposed restrictive practices might be brought to the attention of countries that had imposed the requirement.

Copies of the Committee's report may be obtained from U.N. Headquarters. The Government will be glad to receive the views of those interested in the report and to answer inquiries directed to it. Any interested groups which desire to discuss the proposals of the Committee with the Government will be given an opportunity to do so. Requests may be addressed to the Secretary of the Interdepartmental U.N. Economic Committee, Department of State. Views which are received will be taken fully into account when a position is formulated for the Council discussions.

Adult Education Seminar To Convene at Ciudad Trujillo

Press release 188 dated April 10

The U.S. Government has accepted the invitation of the Government of the Dominican Republic to send a representative to a Seminar on Adult Education which will be convened at Ciudad Trujillo on April 14, 1953. Dr. Bess Goodykoontz, who is the Director of Comparative Education, Division of International Education, Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, has been designated U.S. representative at the seminar.

The purpose of the seminar is to provide an opportunity for specialists from the American Republics to review recent progress and consider specific aspects in the education of adults. The participants will discuss the fundamental education of the adult, including techniques for teaching adults how to read and write, and national literacy campaigns; the primary school and its role in the prevention of adult illiteracy; expanding cultural opportunities for adults, by such means as night schools, educational motion pictures and radio and television broadcasts, and public libraries; programs and means for improving adult life in industry and agriculture as well as in the home and the community; and the relation of adult education to international peace.

The seminar is being convened on the initiative of the Government of the Dominican Republic, pursuant to a 1952 resolution of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization which recommended that member governments develop activities in adult education in their respective countries and that they hold regional and national meetings on the subject.

April 27, 1953

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- Korea. (a) Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. (b) Reports of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction. Supplementary report of the First Committee. A/2368, Mar. 9, 1953. 6 pp. mimeo.
- Methods Which Might Be Used To Maintain and Strengthen International Peace and Security in Accordance With the Purposes and Principles of the Charter: Report of the Collective Measures Committee. Report of the First Committee. A/2370, Mar. 17, 1953. 3 pp. mimeo.
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Security Council

- Letter Dated 28 February 1953 From the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syria Addressed to the Secretary-General Concerning the Report Dated 30 October 1952 of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization (S/2833). S/2956, Mar. 12, 1953. 10 pp. mimeo.
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- Allegations Regarding Infringements of Trade Union Rights Received Under Council Resolution 277 (X). Communications received from the General Workers' Union of British Honduras. E/2333/Add.27, Feb. 24, 1953. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Report of the International Monetary Fund. E/2351/Add.1, Mar. 5, 1953. 7 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Senate Begins Consideration of NATO Treaties

On April 7 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations began its consideration of three NATO treaties: The Status of Forces Agreement, the Protocol thereto on International Military Headquarters, and the Agreement on the Status of NATO Forces.

Expressions of support for the treaties came in the form of a statement made before the Committee by Under Secretary Smith and in a letter addressed by Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr., U.S. special representative in Europe, to Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Following are the texts of Under Secretary Smith's statement; President Eisenhower's message transmitting to the Senate the Protocol on Military Headquarters, together with Secretary Dulles' letter forwarding the Protocol to the President; and Ambassador Draper's letter to Senator Wiley.

UNDER SECRETARY SMITH'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 7

Press release 177 dated April 7

I am here to support three documents which you are now considering: The NATO Status of Forces Agreement,¹ the Protocol thereto on Military Headquarters,² and the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.³

Secretary Dulles has asked me to express his regrets that, because of the arrival of Chancellor Adenauer today, he cannot appear before you. I know that he would have liked to have personally expressed his strong support for the early ratification of these three treaties.

We have here three treaties designed to translate policy into action. These are multilateral treaties, consonant with our obligations under the U.N. Charter and under the North Atlantic Treaty. They were negotiated within the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization in order to establish a uniform basis for dealing with a large number of the legal and administrative problems which have naturally arisen in connection with operations of the Organization. The United States was one of the leaders in developing the text of these treaties. I hope that the United States will, by adopting these treaties, continue to evidence its support of this vital collective-security effort and its leadership in seeking practical solutions for practical problems.

The treaties under consideration provide for the operations of NATO forces, NATO headquarters, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself.

First, there is the Agreement on the Status of Forces, signed at London on June 19, 1951. This agreement is intended to establish a uniform basis of responsibilities, rights, and privileges applicable to the forces of the respective NATO countries and related civilians while in the territory of other NATO countries.

The second agreement is a protocol to the Status of Forces Agreement. It establishes the entity of the integrated military headquarters of NATO and creates certain responsibilities, rights, and privileges necessary for their operations within the territory covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.

The third agreement deals with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself, its international staff and national representatives thereto and establishes the responsibilities, rights, and privileges that will govern them. I should like to speak briefly about the major aspects of each of these documents in turn.

Status of Forces Agreement

Turning first to the Agreement on the Status of NATO Forces, it is noteworthy that this agreement, like the North Atlantic Treaty effort itself, is precedent-making. Never before have peace-loving nations dedicated themselves to a peacetime effort which would integrate their defense preparations. This concept of integrated defense planning gives greater defensive strength for the same amount of expenditure in manpower, material, and money. Naturally, it involves the poten-

¹ S. Exec. T, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

² S. Exec. B, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

³ S. Exec. U, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

tial stationing and movement of forces of each of the North Atlantic Treaty nations in the territory of any one of them, as NATO plans are directed toward the defense of the whole North Atlantic Treaty area.

The administrative problems connected with the stationing of foreign forces in the territory of any member NATO state are manifold. An orderly basic system of rights, responsibilities, and procedures must be established for the following reasons: (1) to reduce the administrative burden on the troop commanders; (2) to reduce to a minimum the area of possible dispute between countries who send troops and countries who receive them; (3) to insure that the people of the countries who receive troops are protected as to life, limb, property, and security from acts of foreign troops or civilians.

We have had arrangements concluded in wartime on these legal and administrative subjects governing our troops abroad both in World War I and World War II. Such arrangements are quite different from the treaties before you, which are intended to govern deployments for the indefinite period of the cold war. Provisions that were proper for agreements negotiated in wartime obviously could not be expected to be applied to this different operation. We have secured the best possible terms for these circumstances. They are very good terms. They will provide a firm and uniform base in lieu of the varied informal, interim, and *ad hoc* arrangements which have governed our present deployments abroad pending action on this treaty.

Each country, of course, has had to reconcile its desires to have maximum rights for its troops abroad with its natural inclination to grant minimum privileges to other troops coming to its territory. The controlling idea has been to provide a reasonable and just basis that would serve the purposes I have just outlined.

The resulting agreement therefore represents, as do all three agreements, a giving and a taking on the part of all. Insofar as it affects the United States, I believe that it both protects our interests as a nation sending troops abroad and as a nation receiving foreign troops here.

This agreement covers all members of the armed forces of any NATO nation, civilians employed by those armed forces and serving with them, and their immediate dependents, while in other NATO nations under orders. It establishes very clearly that these persons must respect the law of the foreign country in which they may be stationed.

It then deals with a number of aspects of rights, responsibilities, and privileges, and with your permission I should like to refer to certain of the most important aspects which are covered.

We had to develop arrangements that would permit ready movement of military forces in peacetime across international borders. At the same time, those procedures could not overlook

the security interests of the nations receiving forces. Although the result has been to exempt military personnel from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection as well as from alien registration control laws, this does not mean that security will be neglected. Military personnel must be appropriately identified, of course. I can assure the Committee that screening procedures are being established and that an interim procedure has been adopted for immediate application which all interested agencies of the executive branch are agreed on as appropriate and adequate for that purpose. If the circumstances require, any state may arrange the removal of any individual from its territory.

The problem of jurisdiction in cases of criminal offenses had to be settled. Even as this country did not wish to surrender all of its rights with respect to criminal jurisdiction for offenses committed by foreign forces here, other countries were reluctant to totally surrender their rights. At the same time, it was fully appreciated that the government which sends persons abroad would wish to insure that any trials of its personnel were appropriately conducted.

The result was the creation of a system of jurisdiction that provides that offenses committed in performance of duty, or treason, or espionage against his own country, will subject a person to trial by his own authorities. Other offenses against the law of the foreign country where a man is stationed will be subject to trial in the foreign courts, but the foreign government must give sympathetic consideration to requests for waiver of that right. The normal safeguards of fair trial—the right of counsel, the right to a fair and speedy trial, the right to procure witnesses, and protection against double jeopardy—are expressly covered.

The Committee is aware that under the administrative agreement with Japan we agreed to immediately conclude with Japan, at its option, once we have ratified this Status of Forces Agreement, an agreement on criminal jurisdiction similar to the provisions of this agreement.

The subject of claims is a complex and technical one. Again, we had to resolve these problems on a basis of practicality and equity. The provisions on claims had to be clearly established in order that the rights of the citizenry as well as the states covered by the agreement would be protected. The procedures adopted result in the sharing of liability in cases of normal military operations and the appropriate determination of responsibility on an equitable basis in other cases.

The treaty sets forth a number of procedures designed to safeguard the economy of the country receiving foreign forces from the impact of uncontrolled local purchasing and similar operations. Reasonable and practical channels of dealing with the civilian community are established.

I know that the Congress has been interested

in the subject of tax relief. The treaty neither provides nor precludes general tax relief on expenditures for the common defense. The executive branch has concluded a series of arrangements with pertinent NATO countries, parties to this agreement, which provide for relief from taxes upon such U.S. expenditures. Copies of these arrangements are available.

The treaty provides for the contingency that operations in time of hostilities may require different arrangements. Provision is made for necessary modifications.

The grant and receipt of certain customs exemptions and of freedom from certain customs procedures are covered, and other administrative privileges and immunities are set forth in the agreements.

In summation of this agreement then, we find that procedures are established which will reduce possible areas of frictions and eliminate the worries of governments and populations as to the conduct of foreign troops upon their soil. Some such procedures are essential. These procedures appear reasonable, equitable, and just. In considering them from a practical point of view, the Senate will also wish to recall that the stationing of large numbers of foreign forces in the United States is probably not indicated, whereas we have many people abroad.

Protocol on Military Headquarters

I should like to turn now to the Protocol on Military Headquarters. This protocol is necessary because of the international character which necessarily attaches to the military headquarters of an integrated force.

This protocol will apply to the respective headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commanders of NATO. These will include General Ridgway's Headquarters in Paris, Admiral McCormick's Headquarters at Norfolk, Va., and the Headquarters of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Channel Command in England. It will also cover headquarters immediately under them and such other subordinate headquarters as the North Atlantic Council determines.

Because it is desirable to consider these headquarters as separate entities, they are given the right to acquire property, make contracts and the capacity to sue and be sued.

In general, persons attached to these headquarters by the respective NATO nations and their civilian components and employees are given rights and responsibilities parallel with those created in favor of individuals and forces covered by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.

A few points of difference are noteworthy. The International Headquarters are given no jurisdiction to handle criminal cases, certain claims matters, and certain other administrative matters in their own right—these remain the responsi-

bility of the state attaching the individual to the headquarters. For obvious reasons of military security, the records of the headquarters are declared to be immune from process.

And, as in the case of the Status of Forces Agreement, provision is made for change in the protocol in case of actual hostilities.

Again, and before leaving our consideration of the protocol, we should note that this action is precedent-making. We know of no peacetime situation where integrated international headquarters of a military nature have been established. Friction between headquarters and the countries where they are situated, over administrative matters, would deter sorely the NATO defense effort. The procedures established in this agreement present a sound basis to eliminate that difficulty.

Agreement on NATO

The third agreement is the one dealing with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself. The provisions of the agreement give to the Organization legal stature with powers and obligations consistent with its functions. In many respects it assimilates the Organization to a diplomatic mission and provides appropriate status for the international staff and members of delegations to the Organization.

The agreement is necessary if the respective delegations and representatives to the NATO and their staffs, together with the international secretariat and subordinate bodies of the Organization, are to perform their functions.

The Council and the subsidiary bodies concerned are the entities covered by the treaty. Most of these are situated at Paris. A few others are situated elsewhere in Europe. At the present time the only entities covered by this treaty and situated in the United States are the Standing Group of the Military Committee and the Military Representatives Committee which are located in Washington. The Military Headquarters, as we have already noted, are covered by the special protocol dealing with them.

The agreement includes safeguards to assure cooperation and respect for local laws. Provision is made for waiver of immunity from process, and each nation retains an unabridged right to require any person who abuses any privilege to leave its territory.

There are provisions in this agreement, as in the case of the Protocol on Military Headquarters, which authorize the United States to enter into an arrangement with the Organization providing that the United States may employ and tax its own citizens. The United States has entered into such arrangements.

I have mentioned the most important parts of these agreements. They deal with matters of interest to various government agencies and have

been negotiated in consultation with the Departments of Justice, Defense, and Treasury, whose representatives are also present here.

A bill to implement the claims provisions of the treaties has been transmitted to the Congress.⁴ The interested agencies are agreed that they do not require, and do not plan to submit, further legislation to implement any of the proposed treaties.

I would like to refer to the respective messages of the President transmitting these agreements to the Senate, as well as to the letters of the Secretary of State forwarding them to the President, and to say that I support the statements contained therein.

In conclusion I want to express my appreciation for this opportunity to appear before this Committee, to assure you of the desire of the Department of State to be as helpful as possible in explaining any matters connected with these proposals, and to submit to this Committee my personal belief that the early ratification of these agreements will be a step forward in the integration of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

The NATO nations are agreed that the early ratification of these agreements is desirable. Already there are three ratifications of the Status of Forces and Civilian Agreements, and one of the protocol.

In the interest of setting up fair and equitable ground rules under which nationals of one country can be stationed in and work in the territory of other countries, in furtherance of the vital NATO defense effort, I consider these agreements desirable and in the best interests of the vital foreign policy of the United States.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO THE SENATE⁵

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 27, 1953.

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of a protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Paris on August 28, 1952. This document is a protocol to the agreement regarding status of forces of parties of the North Atlantic Treaty, and is related to the agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, both previously transmitted

⁴Reference here is to draft legislation transmitted by the Department of Defense on Jan. 19 entitled "A Bill To Provide for the Orderly Settlement of Certain Claims Arising Out of Acts or Omissions of Civilian Employees and Military Personnel of the United States in Foreign Countries and of Civilian Employees and Military Personnel of Foreign Countries in the United States, and for other purposes."

⁵S. Exec. B, 83d Cong., 1st sess. President Truman's Messages to the Senate and forwarding letters sent to him by Secretary Acheson are contained in S. Exec. T, 82d Cong., 2d sess., and S. Exec. U, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

to the Senate in the second session of the 82d Congress.

The Status of Forces Agreement of 1951 and the present protocol, as well as the companion agreement relating to the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself, are necessary parts of the new machinery we need to carry forward the vital program for the integrated defense forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These are multilateral agreements and thus provide that basis of uniformity in these fields which is essential for NATO and its integrated operations. While these agreements do not in every respect reflect the maximum desires of each country, and to that extent represent certain compromises on the part of all, it is my considered belief that they provide a workable, equitable, and desirable framework for NATO activities and peacetime NATO military operations. The early acceptance of these agreements by the NATO nations is very important to the furtherance of the NATO collective-defense effort.

I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report made to me by the Secretary of State regarding this protocol.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

SECRETARY DULLES' FORWARDING LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT⁶

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
February 25, 1953.

I have the honor to submit to you a certified copy of a protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Paris on August 28, 1952, with the recommendation that it be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The protocol has as its purpose the definition of the status of any Supreme Headquarters or Allied Headquarters, and members of their staffs, which may be established in the territory of any of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. Supreme Headquarters is defined in the protocol to mean Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and any equivalent international military headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty. Allied Headquarters is defined to mean any Supreme Headquarters and any international military headquarters which is immediately subordinate to a Supreme Headquarters.

The status of an Allied Headquarters and its personnel is determined primarily by setting forth in the protocol the principles which shall govern the application thereto of the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces, signed at London June 19, 1951 (S. Ex. T, 82d Cong., 2d sess.). Sub-

⁶S. Exec. B, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

ject to the provisions of the protocol, the agreement is to apply to Allied Headquarters in the territory of a party to the protocol in the North Atlantic Treaty area, and to the military and civilian personnel of such Headquarters and their dependents. The basic points covered with respect to applying the status of forces agreement of 1951 may be summarized as follows:

1. The rights and obligations which the agreement gives to or imposes upon the sending state or its authorities in respect of its forces or their civilian components shall, in respect of an Allied Headquarters and its personnel, be vested in or attached to the appropriate Supreme Headquarters and the authorities responsible under it, subject to certain exceptions enumerated in article 4 of the protocol.

2. The obligations to waive claims imposed on the contracting parties by article VIII of the agreement shall be attached both to Allied Headquarters and to any party to the protocol concerned. The claims to which paragraph 5 of article VIII of the agreement applies shall include claims arising out of acts or omissions of any of the employees of an Allied Headquarters, or out of any other act, omission, or occurrence for which an Allied Headquarters is legally responsible, and causing damage in the territory of a receiving state to third parties other than to any of the parties to the protocol.

3. The exemption from taxation accorded under article X of the agreement to members of a force or civilian component in respect of their salaries and emoluments shall apply, as regards personnel of an Allied Headquarters, to salaries and emoluments paid to them as such personnel by the armed service to which they belong or by which they are employed, except that they shall not be exempt from taxation imposed by a state of which they are a national.

4. An Allied Headquarters shall have, subject to the same conditions, the rights granted to a force under article XI of the agreement with respect to customs laws and regulations of a receiving state.

In addition to prescribing how the status of forces agreement of 1951 shall apply, the protocol accords to an Allied Headquarters special privileges and benefits. These include:

1. For the purpose of facilitating the establishment, construction, maintenance, and operation of Allied Headquarters, such Headquarters are to be relieved so far as practicable from duties and taxes affecting expenditures by them in the interest of common defense and for their official and exclusive benefit, and each party to the protocol is to enter into negotiations with any Allied Headquarters operating in its territory for the purpose of concluding an agreement to give effect to this provision.

2. No measure of execution or measure directed to the seizure or attachment of its property or funds shall be taken against any Allied Headquarters, except for the purpose of paragraph 6 (a) of article VII and article XIII of the agreement.

3. To enable it to operate its international budget, an Allied Headquarters may hold currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency.

4. The archives and official documents of an Allied Headquarters kept in premises used by those Headquarters or in the possession of any properly authorized member of the Headquarters shall be inviolable, unless the Headquarters has waived this immunity. Allied Headquarters shall, however, at the request of the receiving state and in the presence of a representative of that state, verify the nature of any of such documents to confirm they are entitled to such immunity.

The protocol further provides that each Supreme Headquarters shall possess juridical personality and recognizes the capability of a Supreme Headquarters, under certain conditions, to conclude contracts and to acquire or dispose of property. A Supreme Headquarters may also, subject to the provisions of article VIII of the agreement, engage in legal proceedings as claimant or defendant.

Under the protocol, any assets acquired from the international funds of an Allied Headquarters under its capital budget and no longer required by the Headquarters are to be disposed of under arrangements approved by the North Atlantic Council and the proceeds distributed among or credited to the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty in the proportions in which they have contributed to the capital costs of the Headquarters. Any land, buildings, or fixed installations provided for the use of an Allied Headquarters by the receiving state without charge to the Headquarters are to be handed back when no longer needed to the receiving state, and any increase or loss in the value of such property resulting from its use by the Headquarters shall be determined by the North Atlantic Council and distributed among or credited or debited to the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty in the proportions in which they have contributed to the capital costs of the Headquarters.

With respect to taxation of employees of an Allied Headquarters of categories agreed by the North Atlantic Council, a formula has been provided in the protocol that is similar to the one evolved in the agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, signed at Ottawa on September 20, 1951 (S. Ex. U, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), concerning taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid by the Organization to its officials. This formula provides exemption for employees who are paid directly by Allied Headquarters, but enables those states which desire to conclude an arrangement with Allied Headquar-

ters to employ and assign all of its nationals who are to serve on the staff of Allied Headquarters, to pay the salaries and emoluments of such persons from its own funds at a scale fixed by it, and to charge income tax on the salaries and emoluments so paid. In accordance with this provision, the United States is about to sign an agreement with the North Atlantic Council, acting on behalf of International Military Headquarters, whereby this Government will employ and assign to such Headquarters all United States nationals who are to serve on the staff thereof and pay the salaries and emoluments of such persons from its own funds at a scale fixed by it. This arrangement will be similar to the one transmitted to the Senate for its information in connection with the agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and printed in Senate Executive U, 82d Congress, 2d session.

This protocol is related to the agreement regarding the status of forces of parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, and the agreement relating to the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, transmitted to the Senate in the second session of the 82d Congress. The former agreement also relates to the administrative agreement with Japan, insofar as that agreement provides that upon the coming into force with respect to the United States of the "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces," signed at London June 19, 1951, the United States will immediately conclude with Japan, at the option of Japan, an agreement on criminal jurisdiction similar to the corresponding provisions of that agreement.

These agreements provide for the basic uniformity in these fields which is required in the interest of integrated operations. They represent a successful reconciliation of the views of the various countries concerned and establish basic rights and responsibilities which, though not fully satisfying the views of all countries in every respect, nevertheless represent a reasonable, practical, and realistic formula for these areas from the point of view of the United States, both as a nation sending troops abroad under these agreements and as a nation which may be receiving foreign troops here under their terms.

It is considered important, from the point of view of furthering the NATO collective defense effort, that these agreements be accepted by the NATO nations at the earliest possible date.

It is hoped that the Senate will give favorable consideration to the protocol at the same time that it considers the agreement on the status of forces of 1951.

I am authorized to state that the Secretary of Defense concurs in the necessity for the early ratification of these agreements.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

AMBASSADOR DRAPER'S LETTER OF MARCH 6

Press release 178 dated April 7

PARIS, FRANCE,
March 6, 1953.

MY DEAR SENATOR WILEY: I understand that your committee is presently considering the Status of Forces Agreement, the protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters, and the agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself.

As United States special representative in Europe, and as the United States permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, I urge prompt approval of these agreements by your committee and by the Senate of the United States. During the past two years the fourteen nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in view of the existing threat of armed aggression and in the interest of their own individual and collective security have placed large forces under International Command, many of them outside their own country. Common military headquarters have been created and are now functioning in several NATO countries. It is obvious, in these circumstances, that solutions on some permanent and mutually acceptable basis had to be found for a whole series of problems concerning the relationship of the forces and the international military headquarters to the countries in which they are stationed.

These day-to-day problems concerning customs, jurisdiction, claims, and many other similar matters can only be solved in a spirit of mutual good will. NATO military cooperation in peacetime cannot be effective unless these many troublesome questions are the subject of common agreement.

It is a tribute to the spirit of intimate cooperation which now prevails among the members of the alliance that all of them have been able to reach common agreement on the principles which should control the relationship of armed forces and of international military headquarters to the countries in which they are located.

The Status of Forces Agreement now before the Senate is the result of patient and friendly negotiations over a period of months. It provides for uniform treatment of all NATO forces and makes possible equal treatment for United States forces regardless of the country in which they may be stationed. It appropriately safeguards the interests of the United States and of each of our other NATO partners. I recommend its approval without reservation or amendment. It will, when ratified, make possible satisfactory solution of the problems raised by the presence of national forces in countries outside their own.

Approval by the Senate will be further evidence of the continued support of the American people for the principle of collective security and their confidence in friendly peacetime collaboration with our treaty partners. Without such an agree-

ment the task of the NATO military commanders would be infinitely more difficult and the steady development of common training and planning of the NATO armed forces would be seriously impaired.

The agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself giving appropriate status to its staff and to the fourteen national delegations accredited to it, is indispensable for the proper operation of the organization. It deals appropriately with the variety of problems which emerge whenever an international organization is created. It gives the organization a legal standing, defines its privileges and immunities, and the status of the staff of the organization and that of the national delegations to NATO. This charter for the organization follows closely similar agreements relating to international organizations.

The military headquarters protocol adapts the appropriate provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement to the personnel assigned to international headquarters and gives the necessary legal status to the headquarters themselves.

Approval of these documents by the United States Senate and by the other NATO governments will, in my opinion, mark a milestone in the field of international cooperation and the continued progress of NATO. The fact that these agreements are necessary is eloquent testimony to the fact that NATO has progressed from an organization which existed only on paper a few years ago to a functioning peacetime political and military organization in which fourteen nations are actually pooling their strength in the interest of their own security.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM H. DRAPER, JR.,
U.S. Special Representative in Europe.

Recommendation for Extension of Trade Agreements Act

*Message of the President to the Congress*¹

In my State of the Union message I recommended that "the Congress take the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act under immediate study and extend it by appropriate legislation."

I now recommend that the present act be renewed for the period of 1 year. I propose this action as an interim measure. As such, it will allow for the temporary continuation of our present trade program pending completion of a thorough and comprehensive re-examination of the economic-foreign policy of the United States.

I believe that such a re-examination is imperative in order to develop more effective solutions to the international economic problems today con-

fronting the United States and its partners in the community of free nations. It is my intention that the executive branch shall consult with the Congress in developing recommendations based upon the studies that will be made.

Our trade policy is only one part, although a vital part, of a larger problem. This problem embraces the need to develop, through cooperative action among the free nations, a strong and self-supporting economic system capable of providing both the military strength to deter aggression and the rising productivity that can improve living standards.

No feature of American policy is more important in this respect than the course which we set in our economic relations with other nations. The long-term economic stability of the whole free world and the overriding question of world peace will be heavily influenced by the wisdom of our decisions. As for the United States itself, its security is fully as dependent upon the economic health and stability of the other free nations as upon their adequate military strength.

The problem is far from simple. It is a complex of many features of our foreign and domestic programs. Our domestic economic policies cast their shadows upon nations far beyond our borders. Conversely, our foreign-economic policy has a direct impact upon our domestic economy. We must make a careful study of these intricate relationships in order that we may chart a sound course for the nation.

The building of a productive and strong economic system within the free world, one in which each country may better sustain itself through its own efforts, will require action by other governments, as well as by the United States, over a wide range of economic activities. These must include adoption of sound internal policies, creation of conditions fostering international investment, assistance to underdeveloped areas, progress toward freedom of international payments and convertibility of currencies, and trade arrangements aimed at the widest possible multilateral trade.

In working toward these goals, our own trade policy as well as that of other countries should contribute to the highest possible level of trade on a basis that is profitable and equitable for all. The world must achieve an expanding trade, balanced at high levels, which will permit each nation to make its full contribution to the progress of the free world's economy and to share fully the benefits of this progress.

The solution of the free world's economic problems is a cooperative task. It is not one which the United States, however strong its leadership and however firm its dedication to these objectives, can effectively attack alone. But two truths are clear: the United States' share in this undertaking is so large as to be crucially important to its success—and its success is crucially important to the United

¹ S. doc. 38, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

States. This last truth applies with particular force to many of our domestic industries and especially to agriculture with its great and expanding output.

I am confident that the governments of other countries are prepared to do their part in working with us toward these common goals, and we shall from time to time be consulting with them. The extension for one year of the present Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act will provide us the time necessary to study and define a foreign economic policy which will be comprehensive, constructive, and consistent with the needs both of the American economy and of American foreign policy.

Mr. DeMille To Confer With Mr. Johnson

Press release 198 dated April 18

Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration, has asked Cecil B. DeMille, outstanding leader in the film industry, to come to Washington to confer with him on the use of motion pictures in the overseas information program.

Motion pictures are one of five means of communication used by our overseas information program which also includes the worldwide use of press, radio, Usis libraries, and the Educational Exchange Program. This conference with Mr. DeMille, starting April 20, is part of Mr. Johnson's overall plan to invite leading experts in various fields to give him the benefit of their advice and thinking.

Alfred H. Morton To Become Consultant on Telecommunications

Press release 197 dated April 17

Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration, has asked Alfred H. Morton, Deputy Administrator and head of the Voice of America in New York, to come to Washington to serve as his chief consultant in "the all-important field of telecommunication."

Mr. Johnson said he is determined to create a stronger, more effective, and more efficient International Information and Educational Exchange Program because "this activity is vitally important to the United States Government."

Mr. Johnson, President Eisenhower's choice to revitalize U.S. overseas information activities, said "the program which the new administration envisages requires careful thought, study, and long-range planning."

The Administrator pointed out that Mr. Morton's 30 years' experience in radio and active interest in television since its inception would be invaluable to him at this time, and added, "I am

asking him to make that experience more readily available to me by serving as my chief consultant on those matters here in Washington."

Mr. Morton, well-known leader in the radio industry who has directed the Voice of America since October 1, 1952, stated that he agreed to assume these new responsibilities at Mr. Johnson's request and plans to take over his duties in Washington on Monday, April 20.

Robert J. Francis will be Acting Deputy Administrator of the Voice of America in New York until such time as a new director is appointed.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Telecommunications. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2489. Pub. 4685. 113 pp. 30¢.

Agreement between the United States and American Republics replacing Inter-American radio agreement of Jan. 26, 1940.

Safety at Sea, North Atlantic Ice Patrol. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2507. Pub. 4719. 16 pp. 10¢.

Interim arrangement between the United States and Other Governments revising the scale of contributions under article 37 of the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea—Signed at London May 31, 1929.

Regulation of Production and Marketing of Sugar. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2526. Pub. 4725. 7 pp. 10¢.

Protocol between the United States and Other Governments (prolonging the international agreement of May 6, 1937)—Signed at London Aug. 31, 1951.

Consular Officers. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2494. Pub. 4729. 25 pp. 10¢.

Convention with protocol of signature between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at Washington June 6, 1951.

Mutual Defense Treaty. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2529. Pub. 4733. 8 pp. 10¢.

Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines—Signed at Washington Aug. 30, 1951.

Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Mexico. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2404. Pub. 4736. 47 pp. 20¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Mexico—Signed at Washington Mar. 17 and 18, 1947; Feb. 9 and Mar. 28, 1949; and at Mexico City Sept. 26 and Oct. 3, 1947; Nov. 24 and 26, 1947; and Dec. 15, 1947; agreement dated at Mexico City Feb. 3 and 12, 1949.

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Press releases issued prior to April 13 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 175 of Apr. 6, 177 of Apr. 7, 178 of Apr. 7, 187 of Apr. 10, 188 of Apr. 10, and 190 of Apr. 11.

No.	Date	Subject
†191	4/13	Rubottom: Pan Americanism
†192	4/15	Swiss-German property agreement
†193	4/15	Auerbach: Visa function
†194	4/16	Morton: U.S. trade policy
*195	4/16	Linder: House dairy committee
†196	4/16	Text of German bond agreement
197	4/17	Morton: Chief consultant, Mr. Johnson
198	4/18	Mr. DeMille to confer with IIA
†199	4/18	Ministerial meeting of NAC
200	4/18	Dulles: The first 90 days

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

*Not printed.